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Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors 
Wendy J. Gordon* 
In the recent and much publicized Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony 
Corp. of America (Betamax) case, 1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that persons who make videotapes of copyrighted television programs in 
the privacy of their homes should be considered to be copyright infringers.2 
Basic to the court's reasoning was a misunderstanding of the "fair use" 
doctrine. Called "the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copy-
right, " 3 "fair use" renders noninfringing certain uses of copyrighted material 
that might technically violate the statute, but which do not violate the statute's 
basic purposes. 
The Ninth Circuit took the position that "fair use" could only protect 
users who were productive second authors, and not persons who were making 
ordinary or "intrinsic" use like the home videotapers.4 In doing so, the circuit 
court rejected explicitly the economically oriented approach to fair use 
adopted by the Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States.G 
In its opinion in Williams & Wilkins, which was affirmed by an equally 
divided Supreme Court in 1975,6 the Court of Claims held that massive 
photocopying efforts by libraries could in some circumstances constitute fair 
use. 7 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in the Betamax case, 8 
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I. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
2. Id. at 969. 
3. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). The 
complexity of the issues underlying fair use has been recognized since its inception. See, e.g., 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
4. Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d at 970; see also id. at 971 (new technology strains the fair 
use doctrine in removing control of access from the author). The court relied there on a 
thoughtful work by Leon Seltzer. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The "Exclusive 
Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 215 (1977), reprinted in L. 
Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use In Copyright (1978). 
5. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per 
curiam). 
6. 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). 
7. The Williams & Wilkins opinion is discussed infra notes 249-88 and accompanying text. 
8. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-
1687. 
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and may take this occasion to choose between the Court of Claims's approach 
and the more restrictive doctrinal views of the Ninth Circuit. 
This Article suggests that the Court of Claims opinion in Williams & 
Wilkins, while flawed in many of its aspects,9 did not err in seeking a base for 
fair use in structural and economic considerations. Specifically, it will be 
argued that the fair use doctrine, though sometimes called an "equitable rule 
of reason" for which no definition is possible, 10 has at bottom three straight-
forward concerns. Where (1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the 
desired use through the market; 11 (2) transferring control over the use to 
defendant would serve the public interest; 12 and (3) the copyright owner's 
incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to pro-
ceed, 13 courts have in the past considered, and should in the future consider, 
defendant's use "fair." While other approaches to fair use may legitimately 
be advanced, much of fair use depends on the resolution of these concerns. 
This Article will suggest that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view, the 
"productive" status of a user is at best merely a secondary indicator that these 
concerns may be satisfied. 14 On a more fundamental level, the Article will 
illustrate how the courts and Congress have employed fair use to permit 
uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectu-
ation through the market. 15 The market approach will provide a guide both to 
ascertaining where the public interest might lie in a given case, and to identify-
ing those occasions on which a court may appropriately substitute its evalua-
tion of the public interest for its usual refusal to second-guess the copyright 
owner. Through analysis of the Williams & Wilkins16 and Betamax17 cases, the 
Article will also indicate how a market approach can serve as a means for 
applying fair use to newly emerging uses of copyrighted works made possible 
9. This Article will analyze critically certain aspects of the Court of Claims's opinion, see 
infra notes 260-88 and accompanying text. Other aspects of the opinion have been the subject of 
much analysis. See, e.g., Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in 
Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1052 (1975). 
10. "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts." H.R. Rep. No. 
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5679. 
In 1961, the then Register of Copyrights described fair use as follows: " '[F]air use' ... 
eludes precise definition; broadly speaking, it means that a reasonable portion of a copyrighted 
work may be reproduced without permission when necessary for a legitimate purpose which is not 
competitive with the copyright owner's market for his work." Staff of House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copyrights 
on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 24 (Comm. Print 1961). Another often 
quoted definition is that fair use is a "privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the 
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly 
granted to the owner." H. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944). 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91 & 150-98. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 92-103 & 199-240. 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 104-24 & 241-47. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 295-307. 
15. See infra notes 150-240 & 295-97 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 249-88. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 289-322. 
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by developing technologies. Overall, by unifying the various traditional fair 
use factors into one economic model, the Article aims to serve as an aid to 
predicting fair use results and as a guide to future development of the doc-
trine. 
I. COPYRIGHTS AND MARKETS 
A. Origins of the American Copyright System and the Doctrine of Fair Use 
The Constitution gives Congress power to grant to authors and inventors 
exclusive rights over their works in order to ''promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts."18 Beginning in 1790, Congress passed a series of copyright 
statutes;19 the general goal of these statutes has been to establish an incentive 
for authors to create, by providing them an avenue for obtaining remunera-
tion. 20 The ultimate goal is not author remuneration, however, but the ad-
vancement and dissemination of culture and knowledge. 21 
In most cases, the incentive and dissemination purposes of copyright will 
not conflict. Authors will be encouraged to produce and distribute new works 
because the copyright laws give authors the means of being paid for their 
efforts. Madison foresaw exactly this result when he advocated a congression-
al copyright and patent power in The Federalist Papers: "The public good," 
he wrote, "fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals. " 22 Nevertheless, 
tensions are possible, and over time various copyright doctrines have evolved 
to guard against the possibility that the author's right of control over his 
works could defeat rather than serve the public interest in dissemination. 
"Fair use" is recognized as one such doctrine; it seeks to accommodate the 
author's need for remuneration and control while recognizing that in specific 
instances the author's rights must give way before a social need for access and 
use. 23 In other words, the fair use doctrine allows an individual, in certain 
circumstances, to make use of at least a part of an author's work without 
obtaining that author's consent or recompensing the author for that use. 
Historically, it has been no simple matter to decide the appropriate 
boundaries of an author's control.24 As noted above, the fair use doctrine in 
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
19. For an overview of copyright history, see B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 
1-38 (1967); A. Latman & R. Gorman, Copyright for the Eighties 1-10 (1981). 
20. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
21. See, e.g., Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). The current debates on fair use do not attack this 
general principle, but center on the extent to which the incentive purpose requires enforcement of 
the author's right "to control the cost of and access to" his production in varying circumstances. 
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 
102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
22. The Federalist No. 43, at 272 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
23. See, e.g., Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (I967); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspa-
pers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1173-75 (5th Cir. 1980). 
24. See gen"erally B. Kaplan, supra note 19. 
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particular has been called "the most troublesome in the whole law of copy-
right, "25 and has traced a quicksilver course of judicial development. Con-
gress, in codifying the fair use exception in the Copyright Act of 1976, refused 
to formulate a specific test for determining when a particular use is fair use. 
Instead Congress gave statutory recognition to a list of factors that courts 
have looked to in making their fair use determinations.26 Four factors are 
enumerated in the statute: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
and value of the copyrighted work. 27 
Congress recognized that even for the courts that had developed the criteria, 
the factors were "in no case definitive or determinative" but rather "provided 
some guage [sic] for balancing the equities;"28 the statutory list is nonexhaus-
tive. 29 In addition, Congress encouraged further evolution of the fair use 
doctrine in the courts. 30 
25. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939)), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 
2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
26. The doctrine of fair use was first accorded statutory recognition in the 1976 revision of 
the Copyright Act. The statute provides: 
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
17 u.s.c. § 107 (1976). 
The legislative history of§ 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that, despite the statutory 
recognition accorded fair use, the nature of the doctrine remains to be defined by case law: "The 
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no 
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute . . . . " House Report, supra note 10, at 66, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5680. See also S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 62 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The courts have recognized their freedom to 
continue the development of fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Congress made clear that it in no 
way intended to depart from Court-created principles or to short-circuit further judicial develop-
ment ..•. "). 
27. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1976). 
28. House Report, supra note 10, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 
5679. 
29. The 1976 Copyright Act provides that "[i]n determining whether the use ... is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include" those factors listed in the text. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
The Act provides that the term "including" is "illustrative and not limitative." Id.§ 101. See also 
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It is not clear how much weight should be given to any one of the four 
factors, what additional factors should be considered, or whether any one of 
the factors is a sine qua non for a finding of fair use. 31 Though the factors do 
implicitly direct courts to identify both the social need for the use and the 
possible impact on the author's economic expectations, the ambiguity of the 
fair use doctrine and its statutory formulation obscure the underlying issues 
and make consistency and predictability difficult to achieve. Some underlying 
principles, more specific and thus more informative than the identification of 
basic incentive/dissemination tensions, must be divined beneath the factors to 
permit their coherent application. 
An economic analysis of the copyright system will serve to illuminate 
these underlying principles. Since the copyright system creates private prop-
erty in creative works so that the market can simultaneously provide economic 
incentives for authors and disseminate authored works, it may be useful to 
begin-if not to end-the fair use inquiry by using economic principles of 
market failure to identify the situations in which these two goals are likely to 
conflict. The same economic considerations that guide the copyright system as 
a whole can also be used to suggest modes of resolving the conflicts, providing 
a method of applying fair use both to achieve desirable dissemination and to 
avoid the erosion of incentives. This economic view of fair use can provide a 
House Report, supra note 10, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5681-83 
("Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria 
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by. 
case basis."). The Fifth Circuit recognized the open-ended nature of the statute, but also 
indicated that "normally these four factors would govern the analysis." Triangle Publications, 
Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980). 
30. See supra note 26. 
31. The courts have reached varying results on these questions. The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, recognized that "[t]he statute does not indicate how much weight is to be accorded each 
factor" but considered "the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
the value of the copyrighted work" to be the most important. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980). Other courts have placed 
much emphasis on the amount and substantiality of the portion copied (the third factor). The 
Triangle opinion stated that "the idea that the copying of an entire copyrighted \Vork can never be 
fair use 'is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions and rejected by years of 
accepted practice.' "Id. at 1177 n.15 (quoting Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 
1345, 1353, 203 Ct. CI. 74 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per 
curiam) (citing cases)) (reproduction of copyrighted magazine covers in competitor's comparative 
advertisements held to be fair use). The district court in the Betamax case took a similar position, 
in its functional approach to substantiality. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of 
America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 454-56 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part and remanded 659 F.2d 963 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). See also the "Agreement on 
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions.'' House Report, 
supra note 10, at 68-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5681-83 (copying of 
"complete poem," "complete article, story, or essay" will be fair use if other conditions are met). 
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit intimated that it weighed the quantity of copying quite heavily, 
regardless of its functional impact. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 
F.2d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
Congress took the position that, "[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of 
circumstances that can rise [sic] in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the 
statute.'' House Report, supra note 10, at 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
at 5675-80. 
1982] FAIR USE 1605 
coherent approach to application of the traditional factors and their emerging 
companions. 
B. An Overview of the Market Model 
Markets are systems for consensual exchange of owned goods. Private 
ownership is, of course, only one of many ways in which persons can be 
encouraged to make productive use of resources, 32 and our legal, economic 
and social systems respond with other modes of resource control when the 
markets fail to generate economically desirable outcomes33 or when using the 
market process would threaten other social goals. 34 This Article will show that 
fair use should be interpreted as a mode of judicial response to market failure 
in the copyright context, and that the presence or absence of the indicia of 
market failure provides a previously missing rationale for predicting the out-
come of fair use cases. 
1. The Market System. Economists in the tradition of Adam Smith 
defend our society's primary dependence on markets by arguing that individ-
ual transactions in the marketplace serve both social needs and the needs of 
the individual persons participating. 35 Among other contentions, they suggest 
that the monetary value a person places on a resource will reflect the value 
that the person's use of the resource will bring to society, so that voluntary 
transfers between individuals will create a socially desirable pattern of re-
source allocation. 36 
32. Thomas C. Schelling has written: 
A good part of social organization-of what we call society-consists of institu-
tional arrangements to overcome ... divergences between perceived individual interest 
and some larger collective bargain. Some of it is market-oriented-ownership, contracts, 
damage suits, patents and copyrights, promissory notes, rental agreements, and a variety 
of communications and information systems. Some have to do with government-taxes 
to cover public services, protection of persons, a weather bureau if weather information 
is not otherwise marketable, one-way streets, laws against littering, wrecking crews to 
clear away that car in the southbound lane and policemen to wave us on in the 
northbound lane. More selective groupings-the union, the club, the neighborhood-
can organize incentive systems or regulations to try to help people do what individually 
they wouldn't but collectively they may wish to do. Our morals can substitute for 
markets and regulations, in getting us sometimes to do from conscience the things that in 
the long run we might elect to do only if assured of reciprocation. 
T. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 127-28 (1978). 
33. See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 11-12 (2d ed. 1977). Market failure, 
its effect on economic efficiency, and the variety of available cures are recurrent themes in Judge 
Posner's text. Some significant forms of allocative inefficiency are reviewed in Markovitz, The 
Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
34. See, e.g., G. Calabresi & P. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 31-34 (1978). 
35. See generally R. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers 49-72 (5th ed. 1980); A. Smith, 
Wealth of Nations (E. Canaan ed. 1937). Some argue that a market economy also helps to protect 
and nurture political freedoms. See, e.g., M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 7-36 (1962). 
36. In the examples that follow, "value" will be explored predominantly in terms of how a 
resource user can serve consumer desires. It should not be forgotten, however, that serving one's 
own needs also has value in the economic sense. A person's willingness to pay to use an item for 
personal consumption reflects "social benefit" since each person is a member of society. Also, 
"value," as defined in connection with willingness to pay, see infra text accompanying note 38, is 
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To understand this approach, consider the example of movie producers 
who wish to purchase the motion picture rights to a best-selling novel. 
Smithian economists would posit that each producer's ability to raise funds 
from investors depends on the amount of revenue that his or her movie-
making is expected to generate. Among producers of varying levels of skill, 
the producer best able to use the book to satisfy consumer tastes will be in a 
position to raise the most funds and thus to offer the highest bid. Similarly, 
the author or other owner of copyright in the novel will sell the rights only if 
the revenues he could anticipate by exploiting the work himself would be less 
than the purchaser's bid. Control over the resource will therefore gravitate 
through consensual transfers to the person in whose hands the resource can 
best be used to satisfy consumer desires.37 In this way value, defined as 
"human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay 
for goods and services, " 38 will be maximized. 
of course dependent, inter alia, on distribution of income, and is at best only an indirect measure 
of desire and benefit. While an exploration of the limitations and virtues of the "value" criterion 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that courts sometimes use intuitive 
noneconomic measures of social benefit. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
37. Judge Posner explains this process by using the following example: 
Let Farmer A own a piece of land which he anticipates will yield him $100 a year, in 
excess of labor and other costs, indefinitely. Just as the price of a share of common stock 
expresses the present value of the anticipated earnings to which the shareholder will be 
entitled, so the present value of a parcel of land that is expected to yield an annual net 
income of $100 can be calculated and is the minimum price that A will accept in 
exchange for his property right. Suppose Farmer B believes that he can use A's land 
more productively than A, i.e., that he could net more than $100 a year from working 
A's land. The present value of B's higher expected earnings stream will, of course, 
exceed the present value calculated by A. Suppose the present value calculated by A is 
$1000 and by B $1500. At a price of $1250, for example, A will receive $250 more than 
the land is worth to him and B will pay $250 less than the land is worth to him. Thus, 
there are strong incentives for the parties voluntarily to exchange A's land for B's 
money, and if B is as he believes a better farmer than A, the transfer will result in an 
increase in the productivity of the land. Through a succession of such transfers, re-
sources are shifted to their most valuable uses and efficiency in the use of economic 
resources is thereby maximized. 
R. Posner, supra note 33, at 29 (footnotes omitted). 
38. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). Judge Posner defines "efficiency" as the maximization of 
"value" so measured. Id. Note that under this definition, it is "efficient" to take resources from 
a person in whose hands they have less "value" and give them to another person in whose hands 
they have more "value," even if the loser is not compensated for the transfer. Even aside from the 
general questions that can be raised concerning any quasi-utilitarian measure, the adequacy of 
Judge Posner's "value" as a test of public welfare has been often questioned. See, e.g., Leff, 
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 477-82 
(1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis As a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to 
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1665, 1679-81 (1974). This Article 
does not argue that maximizing value is a sufficient justification for all instances of fair use; it 
argues that the copyright owner must be compensated if denying him control over a contested use 
of his work would cause him substantial injury. See infra text accompanying notes 104-24. Sec 
also generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967) (evaluating "efficiency" and other 
criteria in the identification of which of the losses occasioned by governmental activity should be 
noncompensable and which should be entitled to "just compensation"). 
The traditional criterion that welfare economics has used for "judging whether resource use 
is efficient" is the Pareto Condition in which "no reallocation can yield improvement for some 
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Economists agree that several "conditions of perfect competition" must 
be satisfied if individual market transactions are to result in the maximization 
of value. When these conditions are absent, reliance on consensual bargains to 
achieve socially desirable results may be inappropriate. 39 One such condition 
is that all costs and benefits must be "internal" to the transactions that 
generate them, in the sense that the costs or benefits must be borne by persons 
with decision-making power in a given transaction and not by persons external 
to it.4° For example, if a resource user is in a field where much of the social 
benefit produced by his activities does not translate into compensation to him, 
then he may generate "external benefits" not reflected in his income. In such 
a case, his willingness to pay for the resource might understate his ability to 
use it in a way that serves social needs."1 
Perfect competition also requires perfect knowledge;42 for example, con-
sumers must know the· qualities and characteristics of all available products,43 
as well as the prices and locations of the various sellers. Consider the impact 
of imperfect knowledge on the movie producer example advanced earlier. If 
reviewers give consumers inadequate information about the characteristics of 
movies produced, the money spent on theater tickets may not reflect the 
choices that would in fact best satisfy consumer tastes. 44 As a result, a skillful 
producer might be unable to raise capital in a way that would accurately 
without injury to others." D. Orr, Property, Markets and Government Intervention IOO (1976). 
See infra note 54. See also J. Hadar, Elementary Theory of Microeconomic Behavior 319-45 (2d 
ed. 1974); N. Singer, Public Microeconomics: An Introduction to Government Finance 81-85 (2d 
ed. 1976). However, the Pareto Condition, when interpreted strictly, has only limited usefulness 
as a criterion because "virtually all policies will harm someone." Markovitz, supra note 33, at 2 
n.2. Thus, a Posnerian use of an aggregate measure to define efficiency is common among legal 
scholars. See id. at 2. ("[O]nly rarely does a policy actually move the economy to a Pareto-
preferred position. Accordingfy, I find it more useful to focus on whether a policy seems likely to 
give its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it seems likely to take away from its 
victims.") (footnotes omitted)~ See also Calabresi & Mclamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. I089, I094 (1972) ("[E]conomic 
efficiency .•. asks for that form of property, private or communal, which leads to the highest 
product for the effort of producing."). 
39. There may also be occasions in which it is normatively inappropriate to use even a 
perfectly functioning market. Similarly, enforcement of an author's market right is arguably 
inappropriate when such enforcement would threaten nonmonetizable first amendment interests. 
See infra text accompanying notes 170-73. Some commentators have suggested a separate first 
amendment exception to copyright, while others have suggested recognition of a first amendment 
dimension to fair use. For valuable introductions to this literature, see Denicola, Copyright and 
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 283 
(1979); Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970). 
40. See D. Orr, supra note 38, at ch. 15 ("Externalities and Public Goods"); Markovitz, 
supra note 33, at 2. In the absence of transaction costs, this condition will automatically be met, 
because persons affected by transactions can "bribe" participants within the transactions to take 
actions in accordance with their interest. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L. 
& Econ. 293 (1970). See R. Posner, supra note 33. See also Markovitz, supra note 33, at 7 n.14. 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 170-76, 182. 
42. See Markovitz, supra note 33, at 2, 3, 7; Polinsky, supra note 38, at 1667. See also J. 
Hadar, supra note 38, at § 13.4 ("Behavior Under Uncertainty"). 
43. See Polinsky, supra note 38, at 1667. 
44. See infra text accompanying note 183, which suggests that reviews and criticisms may be 
appropriate subjects for fair use treatment in order to protect the availability of such information. 
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reflect his ability to use resources in satisfaction of consumer tastes, 45 so that 
his ability to pay for the rights to a novel would understate his ability to use 
the novel to serve public needs. In a perfect market, his failure to outbid 
another producer would have been a reliable indicator that the movie rights 
would be most valuable in the other producer's hands. In a market where 
information is incomplete or unreliable, however, a failure to outbid the other 
producer may have no such significance. 
Finally, then, perfect competition depends on the absence of transaction 
costs.46 If all desirable transfers are to occur, it must be costless to obtain 
knowledge, 47 costless to locate all persons affected by a transaction, costless to 
dicker with them over prices and terms, and costless to maintain an enforce-
ment mechanism to ensure that the bargain is adhered to.48 This condition of 
perfect competition, like the others, is never fully present; some transaction 
costs are inevitable. 49 When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits 
that the parties would otherwise anticipate from a transfer, then the presence 
of the transaction costs may block an otherwise desirable shift in resource 
use.50 
The legal system acts in diverse ways to increase the probability that these 
and other conditions for perfect competition will be present. For example, to 
prevent consumer ignorance, truth-in-lending and labeling disclosure laws 
may be enacted, 51 and restrictions on truthful advertising may be struck 
down.52 Similarly, antitrust laws prevent any one buyer or seller from gaining 
monopoly control that would distort competition.53 When the market does 
not work perfectly, "a decision will often have to be made on whether market 
transactions or collective fiat is most likely to bring us closer to the . . . result 
45. See supra note 37. 
46. Transaction costs are "the costs of effecting a transfer of rights." R. Posner, supra note 
33, at 30. Where transaction costs are "prohibitive ... exclusivity of property rights may ••. 
reduce rather than increase the efficiency of resource use." Id. 
47. The condition of perfect knowledge is thus an aspect of the condition of no transaction 
costs, but the two are usefully stated separately. 
48. If bargains are unenforceable, markets are highly unlikely to form. See R. Posner, supra 
note 33, at 65-67 (economic rules of contract law). See also Demsetz, The Private Production of 
Public Goods, 13 J. L. & Econ. 293, 306 (1970) (when nonpurchasers cannot be excluded from 
using a public good at a reasonable cost, a system of private production "does not seem to be 
practical"). This aspect of transaction costs becomes important for the discussion of the Betamax 
case, infra notes 289-322 and accompanying text. 
49. If transaction costs were totally absent, all costs and benefits would necessarily be 
internalized, and value-maximizing transfers would always take place. See generally Coase, supra 
note 40; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1094-95 & n.12. However, transaction 
costs are inevitable in the real world of economics, and the nature and impact of those transaction 
costs may be crucial to a determination of legal rights. See id. at 1096. 
50. Id. at 1095. Relative as well as absolute levels of transaction costs can be important to 
market evaluations, as can the issue of who bears those costs. If nonparticipating third parties 
(e.g., taxpayers) bear the transaction costs, that will insulate the bargaining parties from the 
impact of those costs. 
51. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667e (West 1974 & Supp. 1982); Fair 
Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1976). 
52. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
53. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 33, at 212-13. 
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the 'perfect' market would reach."54 One possible response of the law might 
be the creation of governmental agencies to make resource allocation deci-
sions by regulation. Another might be to set up incentives that encourage the 
achievement of efficient results even in the absence of markets. 
The latter provides the conventional economic explanation for the stand-
ard of reasonable care used in negligence law. 55 In a market transaction, each 
party is forced to take account of the other's demands through bargaining. In 
unintentional accidents, a market bargain between the participants is obvi-
ously impossible, yet it is desirable for them to take into account the effect of 
their actions on each other. Negligence law gives a potential defendant the 
incentive to consider the other person's possible injury. If the costs of the 
precautions neglected by the defendant are less than the discounted accident 
costs the precautions would have prevented, 56 the verdict will be for the 
plaintiff.57 If, on the other hand, the court views the defendant's pre-accident 
behavior as cost-justified, the plaintiff's injuries will go unrecompensed.58 
A defendant who deliberately bypasses the market is not likely to find the 
court willing to act as a resource-allocating mechanism; the market guarantees 
compensation to the owner, and usually provides a less expensive and more 
reliable way to determine whether a use is value-maximizing than does the 
deliberation of a judicial stranger to the transaction. 59 A court generally 
should engage in balancing costs and benefits only if market failure has left it 
the only institution able to do so.60 This is one reason why, for many inten-
tional torts, the economic desirability of defendant's action is irrelevant to 
54. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1097 (footnote omitted) (referring to the perfect 
market result as Pareto optimal). The authors define Pareto optimality as "the set of entitlements 
which would lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a 
further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could 
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before." Id. at 1094. 
55. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 33, at 122, 125. However, both the comparative 
negligence doctrine and the contributory negligence doctrine inadequately resolve the problem of 
how to set up incentives when the plaintiff is also negligent. Id. at 123-24. Perhaps the best 
introduction to the economic analysis of accident law is G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 
(1970), which ranges far beyond conventional negligence law. See Calabresi's analyses of incen-
tives and market deterrence, id. at 68-94. 
56. Costs must be discounted by the probability of their occurrence. See R. Posner, supra 
note 33, at 122-23. 
57. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally 
R. Posner, supra note 33, at 119-59. 
58. Whether the prevailing negligence/contributory negligence pattern in fact provides desir-
able incentives is of course a matter of much debate. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 33, at 
122-24; note 55. 
59. See Michelman, supra note 38, at 1180 (discussing "the inability of outside observers to 
appraise ... efficiency of proposed social measures"). Cf. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 524-25 (1945) (arguing that decentralized decisionmaking can 
often utilize knowledge better than can central planning). See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 38, at 1108, 1115-24 (discussing the "likelihood of error" in assessing costs and benefits 
under various liability rules); id. at 1125 ("liability rules represent only an approximation of the 
value of the object to the original owner"). 
60. While the focus of this fair use discussion is necessarily on judicial rules of decision, 
other institutions can also perform the balancing function, and the nature of the institution may 
affect the appropriate rules or principles to be applied. See Michelman, supra note 38, at 1245-57. 
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determining liability; in such cases the defendant could have identified, and 
thus bargained with, the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs involved.61 
2. Markets in Copyright. Copyright and patent law create ownership 
rights in intellectual property, with the primary goal of generating monetary 
incentives for the production of creative works, thereby "promot[ing] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts. " 62 If the creators of intellectual produc-
tions were given no rights to control the use made of their works, they might 
receive few revenues and thus would lack an appropriate level of incentive to 
create. Fewer resources would be devoted to intellectual productions than 
their social merit would warrant.63 
Economists ordinarily characterize intellectual property law as an effort 
to cure a form of market failure stemming from the presence of "public 
goods" characteristics. 64 A public good is often described as having two 
61. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1124-27 (discussing criminal sanctions). 
62. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
63. The Supreme Court has accepted this premise in several contexts. See, e.g., Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954): 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activi-
ties deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948): 
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, Chief Justice Hughes 
spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, "The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." It is said that reward 
to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative 
genius. 
The role of copyright law in the maintenance of economic incentives has been a matter of 
significant debate. See, e.g., Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 75 (1972); 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 291-323 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Breyer, The 
Uneasy Case for Copyright]; Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 421 (1966) (1965 Papers & Proceedings of Am. Econ. Ass'n); Plant, The Economic 
Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 Economica 167 (new series 1934); Tyerman, The Economic 
Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1100 (1971). There is also debate about the extent to which the copyright and 
patent laws serve purposes other than providing incentives. For example, barring potential users 
from copying encourages them to do their own work. See Gorman, Copyright Protection for the 
Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1599 (1963). Intellectual property 
laws can help structure production to increase the output from resources used for technological 
innovation. See Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 
(1977). Copyright may also function to protect the author's own interests in, e.g., the integrity of 
his work. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra, at 284-91; Comment, An Author's 
Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1490, 1491 (1979). 
Nevertheless, it generally is agreed that American law gives copyright and patent protection 
to the producers of intangible products primarily because of the legislative judgment that such 
systems are necessary if producers of intellectual property are to receive a large enough monetary 
return for their labors and investments to insure continued production. See Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
64. Cf. Liebowitz, Copyright and Photocopying: Alternative Institutional Arrangements 3-5 
(Feb. 1981) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Columbia Law Review). How the production of 
I 
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defining traits. First, it is virtually inexhaustible once produced, in the sense 
that supplying additional access to new users would not deplete the supply 
available to others. Second, and more important for the instant purposes, 
persons who have not paid for access cannot readily be prevented from using a 
public good. 65 Because it is difficult or expensive to prevent "free riders" 
from using such goods, public goods usually will be under-produced if left to 
the private market. 66 A familiar example of a public good is national de-
fense. 67 Since it is not possible to use a radar early-warning network in a way 
that discriminates between one person who has paid for defense and his 
neighbor who has not, a less than optimal amount of national defense will be 
produced if its purchase is left to the usual consensual market mechanisms of 
voluntary purchase. Some sort of compulsory payment, such as taxation, and 
central decision-making may be necessary to eliminate free riders and obtain 
the socially desirable amount of defense. 68 
Books and inventions exhibit certain public goods characteristics. 69 Once 
the literary work or the discovery embodied in the invention is made available 
to the public, the sequence of words or the discovery might be used by 
countless consumers without exhausting the supply. Any number of persons 
can simultaneously use the newly invented process or reprint the literature 
without physically depriving others of its use. Physical control, therefore, 
does not offer its usual potential as a mode of inexpensive enforcement for 
excluding free riders.70 
Though taxation and centralized purchasing might provide a satisfactory 
solution for some public goods problems, such an approach is inappropriate 
public goods should be organized has been the subject of much economic debate. See, e.g., 
Demsetz, supra note 48 (arguing that under certain circumstances private producers can produce 
public goods efficiently). 
65. See, e.g., E. Mansfield, Principles of Microeconomics 70 (1974); D. Orr, supra note 38, 
at 285-311. 
"A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good such that, if any person 
Xi in a group XI, ... , Xi .•• , Xn consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from others in the 
group." M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 14 
(1971). Although Olson focuses on this characteristic, he notes that another element in the 
"traditional understanding of public goods" is " 'jointness of supply.' A good has 'jointness' if 
making it available to one individual means that it can be easily or freely supplied to others as 
well.'' Id. at 14 n.21. 
Professor Demsetz distinguishes 
between the public good concept . . • which states that it is possible at no cost for 
additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good, and a different concept, that 
might be identified as a collective good, which imposes the stronger condition that it is 
impossible to exclude nonpurchasers from consuming the good. 
Demsetz, supra note 48, at 295. Under this view, national defense, which is the example used in 
text, see text accompanying notes 66-68, "might be termed an 'approximate collective good.' " 
Demsetz, supra note 48, at 295. 
66. See, e.g., E. Mansfield, supra note 65, at 70, 74-75. See also Markovitz, supra note 33. 
67. See supra note 65. 
68. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 65. 
69. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 63-65. 
70. Cf. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
righted Works [CONTU] IO (1978) (discussing computer programs): 
[I]f the cost of duplicating information is small, then it is simple for a Jess than 
scrupulous-person to duplicate it. This means that legal as well as physical protection is a 
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for much intellectual property. A democratic society demands decentralized 
and diverse creation in the intellectual sphere; freedom from state control is 
essential lest freedom of expression be curtailed by fear of governmental 
reprisal. 71 Thus, for works of expression, the public goods problem is ad-
dressed by another method. Statutes create special property rights for authors; 
they can sell the physical copies of their works and at the same time retain 
legal control over the reproduction and certain other uses of the work em-
bodied in those copies. 72 In other words by the law provides a means for 
excluding nonpurchasers. 73 Copyright law therefore allows a market for intel-
lectual property to function. 
In addition, the copyright law makes it easy to proceed through consen-
sual market transfer. The requirement that a notice of copyright be placed on 
all publicly distributed copies facilitates identification of those works that are 
not in the public domain and cannot be used without purchase of a copyright 
license, and also facilitates identification of the works' owners. 74 The registra-
tion of copyrights in the Copyright Office75 makes owners relatively easy to 
locate, and gives further information on the validity and duration of the 
copyright claimed. To discourage departure from the market system, Con-
gress has made certain copyright violations criminal, 76 and has established 
statutory damages and other devices77 to lighten a plaintiff's enforcement 
task. The copyright statute thus facilitates the functioning of the consensual 
necessary incentive if such information is to be created and disseminated. 
This principle is the underlying principle of copyright .... 
See also Liebowitz, supra note 64, at 4-5. 
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, protection of unpublished literary work was left primarily 
to state law. This so-called "common Jaw" copyright has been argued to have been essentially a 
right of privacy, see Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198-213 
(1890), and bears some similarity to state trade secret protection for undisclosed discoveries and 
inventions. Secret manuscripts are not "public goods"; physical control is sufficient to exclude 
the unwelcome user. 
Common law copyright for expression that is fixed in a tangible medium was abolished by 17 
U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See House Report, supra note 10, at 129-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News at 5745-49. 
71. See Tyerman, supra note 63, at 1117 (exploring the dangers of relying on government 
subsidies). 
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (exclusive rights in copyrighted works); so,urces cited supra 
notes 63-65. 
73. Demsetz argues that if nonpurchasers can be excluded efficiency is potentially attainable 
in a market for public goods. See generally Demsetz, supra note 48. 
74. Generally speaking, the notice on copies must show that copyright is claimed by includ· 
ing three elements: "'°"(or "copyright" or "copr."), the year of first publication, and the name 
of the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV 1980). Under some circumstances omitted or 
defective notice may be forgiven. Id. §§ 405-06 (Supp. IV 1980). Note that some uses (e.g., 
private reading and performance) are not within the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive 
rights. 
75. Id. § 408 (1976). Like the notice requirement, see supra note 74, the copyright registra· 
tion requirement is not absolute. See id. Registration is, however, a prerequisite to bringing most 
infringement actions, id. § 411, and to certain remedies for infringement, id. § 412. 
76. Id. § 506. 
77. See, e.g., id. § 504(c) (1976) (statutory damages); id. § 501 (prima facie proof of 
infringement, standing); id. §§ 502-505 (injunctive relief, impoundment, damages, attorneys' 
fees). Copyright plaintiffs may find it easier to obtain fee awards than defendants. A. Latman & 
R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 538. 
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market78 in four ways: it creates property rights, lowers transaction costs, 
provides valuable information, and contains mechanisms for enforcement. 
When the market functions, no finding that the defendant acted "unrea-
sonably" or against the public interest is requisite for judging culpability for 
the tort of copyright infringement. Like the intentional tortfeasors discussed 
in the preceding section, 79 copiers of creative works ordinarily can identify 
and bargain with copyright owners. If copies are made without permission, 
the court will not use a "reasonableness" test to second-guess whether the 
copyist's production was in the public interest. In the ordinary copyright case, 
the court assumes that the defendant could have, and therefore should have, 
proceeded through the market.80 
Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately. 
Though the copyright law has provided a means for excluding nonpurchasers 
and thus has attempted to cure the public goods problem, and though it has 
provided mechanisms to facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining 
may be exceedingly expensive or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement 
against nonpurchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of 
desirable consensual exchanges. 81 In those cases, the market cannot be relied 
on to mediate public interests in dissemination and private interests in remu-
neration. 82 In extreme instances, Congress may correct for market distortions 
by imposing a regulatory solution such as a compulsory licensing scheme. 83 
Thus, to avoid threatened monopolistic control over the manufacture of piano 
rolls and other mechanical recordings, Congress provided that any person 
who wished could make and sell recordings of copyrighted music, so long as 
he paid to the copyright owner an amount determined under the statute. 84 But 
the broad brush of this regulatory solution is too sweeping for most cases. 
78. Note, however, that the copyright law also uses compulsory licensing for some specified 
classes of works and uses. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(c)-(d) (1976) (cable television retransmission 
of copyrighted material); id. § 115 (phonorecords of nondramatic musical works); id. § 116 
('jukebox' performances). 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
80. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1125-27 (discussing criminal 
sanctions for intentional market bypass). Compare the discussion of intentional torts, supra notes 
59-61 and accompanying text. 
81. As will be seen, the focus is on whether granting fair use to an individual transaction 
would further the goals of the copyright scheme more than would imposing liability. See generally 
infra text accompanying notes 92-124. The transactional, case-by-case approach recommended 
herein does not require identification of any "optimal" level of overall production. Whether 
excluding nonpurchasers can allow a market in public goods to achieve optimality is itself a matter 
of debate. Compare Demsetz, supra note 48 (efficiency achievable if nonpurchasers can be 
excluded from use), with, e.g., Perlman & Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: 
Photocopying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 355, 373-79 (criticizing 
economic analyses of copyright and fair use). It appears that the copyright law treats the outcome 
of the ordinary copyright transaction as normatively equivalent to an "optimal" result. This 
Article seeks to identify what distinguishes an ordinary transactional setting from these settings in 
which the courts are unwilling to trust markets. 
82. Of course, all of the interests are part of society's interests. Compare Michelman, supra 
note 38, at 1194 (analyzing the nature of balancing tests). At issue also is the public interest is the 
public interest in preserving incentives. 
83. See infra notes 84 & 131. 
84. Studies prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., The Compulsory License Provisions of the 
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Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user's departure from 
the market. A useful starting place for analysis of when fair use is appropriate 
is therefore an identification of when flaws in the market might make reliance 
on the judiciary's own analysis of social benefit appropriate.85 By making 
such an identification, a measure of coherence can be brought to the doctrine 
of fair use. As will be seen, there are certain "conditions of perfect competi-
tion"86-or assumptions about how a proper transactional setting should 
look-whose failure is particularly likely to trigger in the courts an unwilling-
ness to rely on the owner's market right to achieve dissemination.87 
II. THE THREE PART TEST FOR DETERMINING FAIR UsE 
Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement 
action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is 
socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial 
injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner. The first element of 
this test ensures that market bypass will not be approved without good cause. 
The second element of the test ensures that the transfer of a license to use 
from the copyright holder to the unauthorized user effects a net gain in social 
value. 88 The third element ensures that the grant of fair use will not undermine 
the incentive-creating purpose of the copyright law. The test will now be 
explored in detail. 
A. The First Element of the Test: Market Failure 
Because courts in the copyright area ordinarily assume that reliance on 
the market will serve social purposes, an economic judgment that transfer of a 
use to defendant will bring a net social benefit should not alone be sufficient 
U.S. Copyright Law (Study No. 5) 11 (Comm. Print 1960) (H. Henn). It has been suggested that 
some of the fears of monopoly may have been unwarranted. See id. at 3 n.20, 11 n.44. 
The provisions governing this compulsory license appeared at § l(e) of the Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified and reenacted 1947, amended 1976), and appear at§ 115 of the 1976 
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976). The provisions are not triggered until the copyright owner has 
himself taken some action to avail himself of the possibility of making mechanical recordings. 
Compulsory licenses are a likely compromise when new rights are granted. See, e.g., Second 
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights of the General Revision of U.S. Copyright 
Law: 1975 Revision Bill (Draft, October-December 1975) at VII 18-20 (fears expressed that 
extending copyright to typefaces would allow a "few big manufacturers ... to enforce tying 
arrangements between their machines and fonts" or "might lead to suits to enjoin publication of 
printed matter;" "mandatory licensing" discussed as a possible solution). See also 17 U.S.C. § 
111 (1976) (cable television retransmission of copyrighted material). 
85. This Article does not purport to present an exhaustive list of the reasons why a court 
might refuse to enforce a copyright owner's market right. It is submitted, however, that in all 
cases where protected subject matter has been appropriated, the courts should give consideration 
to whether there is a good reason-founded in economics or otherwise-to depart from the 
market. 
86. See infra notes 149-98 and accompanying text. 
87. This Article will be using economics to identify certain market defects that are particu-
larly salient, and that appear to cause courts to doubt the appropriateness of enforcing a 
copyright owner's market right. 
88. These first two considerations are closely analogous to those at work in the negligence 
model discussed supra in text accompanying notes 55-58. 
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to negate the tort of infringement. If the work is socially more valuable in the 
buyer's hands, then the economic model has suggested that he will be able to 
raise sufficient funds to purchase permission from the owner. In other words, 
to propose that fair use be imposed whenever the "social value ... outweighs 
any detriment to the artist, " 89 would be to propose depriving copyright own-
ers of their right in the property precisely when they encounter those users 
who could afford to pay for it. Though a transfer to such user might be 
socially desirable, there is no need to compel it through fair use. Such transfer 
will in theory occur voluntarily, through purchase. Further, if the parties 
could arrive at mutually agreeable terms for a transfer, such an agreement 
would be a more reliable indicator of the transfer's value-maximizing quality 
than would a court's distant judgment. 90 
An economic justification for depriving a copyright owner of his market 
entitlement exists only when the possibility of consensual bargain has broken 
down in some way. Only where the desired transfer of resource use is unlikely 
to take place spontaneously, or where special circumstances such as market 
flaws impair the market's ordinary ability to serve as a measure of how 
resources should be allocated, is there an economic need for allowing noncon-
sensual transfer. Thus, one of the necessary preconditions for premising fair 
use on economic grounds is that market failure must be present. Those types 
of market failure that are revealed in the fair use cases and statute will be 
discussed in a later section of this Article. 91 
B. The Second Element of the Test: Balancing Injury and Benefit 
If market failure is present, the court should determine if the use is more 
valuable in the defendant's hands or in the hands of the copyright owner. 92 
One way of accomplishing that goal is to simulate the market inquiry. If, 
when the "market failure" were cured, the price that the owner would de-
mand is lower than the price that the user would offer, a transfer to the user 
will increase social value. 93 
A court may have difficulty in determining what price would have been 
offered or demanded. For example, as will be shown, fair use is often found 
where defendant's use of the work is nqncommercial and yields "external 
89. Note, Parody and Copyright lnfringment, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 585, 595 (1956) ("Fair use 
.•. can be defined as a use which will not seriously discourage progress by artists or as a use 
whose social value greatly outweighs any detriment to the artist whose work is borrowed.") 
(footnote omitted). See also Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 49, 58 (1981). 
90. See supra note 59. 
91. See infra notes 149-98 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The second part of the test inquires into 
the minimum price plaintiff would accept in a hypothetical market to recompense him for the 
injury caused by the defendant's specific use. The broader issue of real-world injury to the market 
as a whole is the subject of the third part of the test. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying 
text. 
93. See R. Posner, supra note 33, at 10-12 (voluntary transactions result in a net increase in 
value). 
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benefits," that is, benefits to society that go uncompensated. 04 In the presence 
of such market failure, the price that the defendant user would offer for use of 
the work will often understate the real social value of his use. The courts in 
fair use cases frequently make intuitive estimates of social value.05 
The court's ability to estimate social value may have the assistance of 
some objective measures. For example, plaintiff's minimum price may depend 
on the loss he would experience from ceding control of the use to defendant, 
and evidence of out-of-pocket losses or of interrupted profits may be avail-
able. In addition, defendant's profits may reflect profits the plaintiff could 
have earned but for the unauthorized use. 96 Where the injury suffered by 
plaintiff is small, it is likely that the market price that he would have de-
manded is small, and that a transfer to defendant would have taken place if 
there had been no "failed market" conditions. Not surprisingly, courts are 
much more likely to find fair use where the injury to plaintiffs is small.07 
When a court weighs plaintiff's loss against the benefit of defendant's 
use, it is making a comparison similar to that made by the participants in 
market transactions.98 It may be said, then, that fair use implies the consent of 
the copyright owner by looking to whether the owner would have consented 
under ideal market conditions. Dean Prosser notes that the locution of "im-
plied consent" is used in the law of intentional torts even where "consent does 
94. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text. 
95. See generally Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-71 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing 
purpose and necessity of use), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973) (value of medical research) (discussed supra notes 249-
88 and accompanying text), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 745-47 (S.D.N.Y.) (discussing valid parody as fair 
use), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 
145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding "a public interest in having the fullest information available on 
the murder of President Kennedy"). 
Intuitive estimates may often be required because of overall imperfections in the market 
structure, see infra note 96, though reference to prices may provide useful constraints for this 
intuition. 
96. The 1976 Copyright Act reflects both these elements in its damages provision: "The 
copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the 
infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not 
taken into account in computing the actual damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976). See also cases 
cited supra note 95. 
Note, however, that insofar as the overall market remains imperfect, actual prices and profits 
might not accurately reflect social desirability, even if that desirability is measured solely in 
economic terms. See E. Mansfield, supra note 65, at 334 (discussing "theory of the second best"). 
Therefore, although such criteria can provide a court with usefully objective guides for its inquiry 
into public interest, they might not be determinative. 
97. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 
1177-78 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357-59, 
1362-63 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (1976) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include- ... (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work."). Nimmer calls market effect the "central fair use factor," 3 
M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 [A][4], at 13-64 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
98. See R. Posner, supra note 33, at 3-12. 
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not exist, and there is no act which indicates it. " 99 As an example of such 
implied consent, Dean Prosser refers to the plaintiff who undergoes an emer-
gency operation while unconscious. There the surgeon who operates to save 
the plaintiff's life is not guilty of a battery because the plaintiff's consent to 
the operation "is 'implied' under the circumstances." 100 To justify imposing 
consent on the patient, Dean Prosser suggests the following explanation: 
"[T]he defendant is privileged because he is reasonably entitled to assume 
that, if the patient were competent and understood the situation, he would 
consent .... " 101 Thus, Dean Prosser has chosen a hypothetical condition 
relevant to the ultimate issue of consent in the context of battery: what would 
the patient consent to "if he were competent" rather than unconscious? 
Are there any such hypothetical conditions relevant to the ultimate issues 
in copyright law? This Article suggests that the perfect market assumptions 
provide a guide to such conditions, because it is only in a functioning market 
that consensual transfers will lead to socially desirable resource use. 102 Are 
there any exigencies-such as the imminence of an unconscious patient's 
death-that will justify resort to hypothetical consent instead of relying s~lely 
on a plaintiff's actual consent? This Article suggests that market failure 
creates such an exigency because, when market failure is present, it is impos-
sible or undesirable to make dissemination of creative works depend solely on 
actual consent. Thus, where transfers will not occur because of market failure, 
courts should ask what the copyright owner would have consented to if he and 
the user had bargained in a functioning market situation. It might be argued 
that the copyright owner should receive compensation for the use in the same 
way that the patient receives the benefit of the operation. However, implied 
consent here serves to indicate that the social welfare is served, while in the 
example of the medical patient it served to indicate that individual welfare is 
99. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 18, at 103 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote 
omitted). 
100. Id. at 103. 
101. Id. 
102. If one would consent to a situation, it is arguably "fair" to impose that situation when 
obtaining actual consent is costly or impossible. As a member of society, the copyright owner 
shares in the cost savings effected by eliminating the need for actual consent in certain situations. 
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 38, at 1176-81 ("to insist on full compensation to every interest 
which is disproportionately burdened by a social measure dictated by efficiency would be to call a 
halt to the collective pursuit of efficiency"). Moreover, since an additional branch of the fair use 
test protects against substantial injury, see infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text, the 
copyright owner has some protection against the possibility that he will be harmed more than 
benefited in the long run. 
Consider the relation between procedure, fairness, and substantive result discussed in J. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), particularly in chapters 1-3 (considering what principles 
persons under certain hypothetical conditions would consent to adopt). For an excellent discus-
sion of the many meanings that "consent" can take in political analysis, see Pitkin, Obligation 
and Consent-I, 59 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 990 (1965), and Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-II, 60 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 39 (1966). 
"Consent" has had a role in fair use commentary. See, e.g., Studies Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Fair 
Use of Copyrighted Works 15, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., (Study No. 14) (Comm. Print 1960) 
[hereinafter cited as Latman Study]. 
1618 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82: 1600 
served; further, implied consent is only the second stage of a three-part 
inquiry. The third stage of the inquiry has a direct concern with the economic 
welfare of the copyright owner .103 
C. The Third Element of the Test: The Substantial Injury Hurdle 
The third and final part of the test is designed to maintain the appropriate 
balance between the incentive and dissemination interests discussed earlier. 
Fair use should be denied whenever a substantial injury appears that will 
impair incentives. 
1. Complete Market Failure. When no incentive purpose would be served 
by giving plaintiff protection, and where no disincentive would be created by 
allowing defendant free use, logic suggests that the courts should then allow 
fair use.104 Assume, for example, that prohibitively high transaction costs 
obtain in a particular area of use, so that copyright owners and potential users 
find that the costs of locating and bargaining with each other exceed whatever 
profit they might expect to gain from the transaction. Under such circum-
stances, no transactions will occur. Therefore, enforcement of market entitle-
ments would not benefit the copyright owner, and would certainly harm the 
potential copyright user who is denied access, as well as those who might 
benefit from the use. Given the presence of a complete market failure here, 
judicial refusal to enforce the owner's right of control may be the only way to 
allow use of the work.105 And since a refusal to enforce in these circumstances 
would not deprive the owner of any revenues he would otherwise receive, there 
is no injury to incentives that might militate against a grant of fair use. 
2. Intermediate Cases of Market Failure. In cases of complete market 
failure, fair use appears to be justified upon satisfaction of the first two parts 
of the fair use test, i.e., identification of market failure and determination 
that there is a net social benefit from allowing defendant's use. There may 
also be intermediate cases of market failure, however, where the market 
cannot be relied upon to generate all desirable exchanges, but where some 
such transactions would be possible. In such instances, giving fair use to a 
class of users would enable some persons who would otherwise purchase the 
use to obtain that use for free. Thus fair use could cause some injury to 
relevant incentives because, for some users, fair use would substitute for 
purchase.106 The first two parts of the test would no longer serve to accommo-
date the competing interests. 
In instances of intermediate market failure, both enforcement (a finding 
of infringement) and nonenforcement (a finding of fair use) have dangers. 
103. The impact on aggregate value caused by the immediate transfer is only part of the 
relevant inquiry. 
104. See also Comment, Photocopying and Fair Use: An Examination of the Economic 
Factor in Fair Use, 26 Emory L.J. 849, 865-71 (1977). 
105. In appropriate cases, awarding the plaintiff a damage remedy may also allow the user 
continued access to the work. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text. 
106. Dam.age by substitution is of course the damage to which the fair use criteria are most 
sensitive. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.0S[B], at 13-65 to 13-72. 
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The danger from enforcement is that desirable transfers may be prevented. 
The danger from giving fair .use is that incentives may be undermined. To 
resolve the conflict, the defendant seeking fair use treatment should be re-
quired to surmount an additional hurdle: fair use should be denied if it woufd 
leave the plaintiff copyright owner facing substantial injury to his incen-
tives.107 
The third branch of the test diverges from the negligence model summa-
rized earlier. 108 In negligence, the decision as to the wrongfulness of defen-
dent's conduct usually depends on a comparison of costs and benefits; if the 
cost of defendant's precautions would have been greater than the decrease in 
accident costs produced, then the defendant is not negligent for having de-
clined to take the precautions.109 The absolute level of damages caused by the 
accident under that kind of analysis is irrelevant.110 Under the third part of 
this fair use test, however, fair use will be denied if a substantial level of 
injury, judged on an absolute scale, would be generated by defendant's use, 
even if the comparison of injury and benefit showed that defendant's use 
would have created a net social benefit. 
The substantial injury hurdle serves several functions. First, it preserves 
the incentive system at the core of copyright. Second, it reflects a recognition 
that judgments the courts make about whether a defendant's use is value-
maximizing are rough approximations. m The substantial injury hurdle pro-
vides some additional protection for copyright owners against the possibility 
of a bad estimation.112 Third, awarding copyright owners a veto whenever 
their injury is substantial gives some guarantee that the fair use system will not 
put them at an intolerable disadvantage. Even if authors are viewed solely as 
instruments of social good, 113 their demoralization as individuals will decrease 
the production of valuable works. 114 The substantial injury hurdle can also 
help courts avoid the danger of making otherwise curable market failures 
permanent through the grant of fair use. To explain this last function more 
fully, it is necessary to look at the nature of the relevant injury. 
107. This hurdle serves not only to protect the individual copyright owner from substantial 
loss but to protect society as a whole from erosion of the copyright system. Compare the function 
of the "just compensation" guarantee as discussed in Michelman, supra note 38. 
108. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
109. Id. 
llO. Broader economic views of accident law might, however, take a different view. See G. 
Calabresi, supra note 55, at 39-67 (exploring modes of spreading heavy losses). 
lll. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1106-10. 
112. Where Congress has elected to give copyright owners a property right in the first 
instance, doubts should be resolved in the owner's favor. 
113. Although the dominant view is clearly that authors receive their property right for a 
larger social purpose, Congress has shown special solicitude for the the welfare of individual 
authors, even as opposed to publishers and other potential owners of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
203, 304(c) (1976) (termination rights); House Report, supra note 10, at 140, reprinted in 1976 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5756 ("the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of 
copyright under the Constitution," is given the right to terminate grants that he may have made to 
publishers and other assignees; made-for-hire works not terminable). 
ll4. See also Michelman, supra note 38, at 1177-80, 1208-24 (discussing demoralization 
costs). 
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Injury is relevant to both the second and third parts of the fair use test, 
but different types of injury are relevant to each part. On the question of 
balancing plaintiff's harm against defendant's benefit, courts should look to 
the injury caused to the copyright owner by the specific use made by defend-
ant. The narrow inquiry reveals whether transferring the use to the def endent 
gives rise to a net social benefit. In order to prevent substantial injury to 
incentives, however, the court should also inquire into the extent of the losses 
likely to follow in the market as a whole from a grant of fair use, 115 both from 
this defendant and from other similarly situated persons. When a determina-
tion is made that a certain kind or practice of use is "fair," the practices of 
persons other than the specific defendant may be affected. As the Senate 
Report to the 1976 Copyright Act states, "Isolated instances of minor in-
fringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major 
inroad on copyright that must be prevented."116 Thus, the inquiry into sub-
stantial injury should include consideration of cumulative harm. 117 
This inquiry should also include harm that has not yet occurred but is 
likely to occur.U8 Both the loss of revenues anticipated under the market 
structure prevailing at the time of suit, and the loss of those revenues that 
would be generated under whatever market structure would follow upon a 
grant of infringement, should be relevant. 119 For example, transaction costs to 
obtain permission to use certain materials might be prohibitively high at one 
point in time, yet in some circumstances a clearinghouse system might be set 
up to simplify the process of purchasing permission and thus allow a market 
to function. To award fair use without regard to the possibility of imminent 
change in the market structure might be to make permanent an otherwise 
curable market failure and thus potentially to insulate a new and valuable use 
from the stimulus of consumer demand. 
Whether a market failure is curable, and whether such a cure would 
follow upon a finding of infringement and generate substantial revenues, are 
difficult factual questions. They must, however, be faced; the courts should 
limit their grants of fair use to those occasions in which the market cannot be 
115. See also M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05[AJ[4], at 13·64 to 13·65 (effect of the use 
upon the [plaintiff's] potential market "poses the issue of whether unrestricted and widespread 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact 
on the potential market for or value of the plaintiff's work"); id. § 13.05[EJ[4J[c], at 13-84. 
116. Senate Report, supra note 26, at 65. 
117. See supra note 115. 
118. Cf. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973) 
(finding, inter alia, large-scale library photocopying was not proven to be detrimental to the 
circulation and future commercial value of plaintiff's medical journals), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding no significant potential for future injury to the value of the 
Zapruder films of the Kennedy assassination caused by the unlicensed publication of sketches of 
the key frames in a book advancing a novel theory about the assassination); M. Nimmer, supra 
note 97, § 13.05[A)[4], at 13-65 (courts should look at conduct regardless of "whether in fact 
engaged in by defendant or others"); id. § 13.05[E)[4J[c], at 13-84 ("all potential defendants"). 
119. Discussion about what market structure would follow from a judgment of liability will 
necessarily involve a judgment of probabilities. 
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relied upon to allow socially beneficial uses to occur. This point is particularly 
important for new technologies, such as photocopying120 and videotaping.121 
When a new use for copyrighted works becomes available to the public, 
market mechanisms may take time to develop. At early stages of use, the 
transaction costs that would be involved for a user to purchase permission to 
use, or for the copyright owner to seek enforcement against nonpaying users, 
might well exceed whatever gain the parties might otherwise expect from the 
transaction. A custom therefore may develop under which users proceed 
without permission.122 
As the quantity of use grows, the copyright owners may wish to set up 
collection and enforcement mechanisms, including such market devices as 
clearinghouses.123 In order to persuade users to proceed through the device, 
however, the copyright owners might well need a judicial declaration that the 
uncompensated use, previously minor and left unfettered, constituted an 
infringement of copyright. Such owners would be able to make a showing of 
substantial injury only if a court were willing to consider whether substantial 
revenues would follow after a finding of infringement. 
The risk from granting fair use without reference to such probable injury 
should be obvious. New technologies will make certain copyrighted works 
more valuable, as, for example, the invention of cinema increased the value of 
those books suitable for adaptation to the screen. If copyright protection is 
denied because of an otherwise curable market failure, then the additional 
revenues that would have flowed from the new technological use will not 
appear. If the authors' revenues fail to reflect the additional value that new 
technology gives to such works, then insufficient resources may be drawn into 
their creation. To argue that copyright owners need receive no compensation 
for additional uses of their works124 would overlook the possibility that such 
120. Photocopying was at issue in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam), discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 249-88. Williams & Wilkins Co. has evoked substantial scholarly 
comment. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05[E][4][c]-[e], at 13-82 to 13-92; Perlman & 
Rhinelander, supra note 81. 
121. Home videotaping of on-the-air television programs is of course the issue in the 
Betamax case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. 
Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687), discussed infra text accompanying notes 289-322. The district 
court decision in the case has been extensively discussed. See, e.g., Note, Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks Different on Videotape, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1005 (1980); Note, 
TheBetamaxCase: Accommodating Public Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 
Stan. L. Rev. 243 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Stanford Note]. 
122. Compare the view of custom presented herein with Rosenfield, Customary Use as "Fair 
Use" in Copyright Law, 25 Buff. L. Rev. 119 (1975). 
123. See, e.g., the discussion of the form and function of clearinghouses in Hampton, 
Clearing House as Optimum Solution to Copyright Problems Affecting Communication of 
Educational and Scientific Information, in Reprography and Copyright Law 189 (L. Hattery & G. 
Bush eds. 1964). 
124. Rosenfield argues that in the context of fair use, a copyright owner should be prevented 
"from seeking a greater monopoly than he would have had with the earlier systems of reproduc-
ing copies." Rosenfield, supra note 122, at 122. 
Rosenfield also argues that the custom of nonpayment, see infra notes 224-33 and accompa-
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compensation may change the patterns of production in a desirable way. 
Stimulation of such response is, after all, a basic goal of copyright law. 
D. Alternatives to Fair Use 
Although this Article has advocated the three-part test as a useful ap-
proach for resolving the conflict between the incentive and dissemination 
goals of copyright law, other market-oriented approaches may also be useful 
in achieving this goal. For example, when the cause of the market failure lies 
in high transaction costs, economics does not dictate a choice solely between 
awarding fair use or giving the copyright owner complete control through 
injunction and damages. Instead, if the law permits, the court might choose to 
refuse an injunction yet grant the copyright owner monetary relief. 125 A 
monetary remedy could largely obviate any threatened injury. 
nying text, is an independent justification for fair use, because, inter alia, "the law loses 
credibility with the public" if "a teacher, researcher or scholar may lawfully copy for his private, 
non-profit use only under conditions of maximum inefficiency in the use of technology, time and 
resources." Id. at 136 (footnote omitted) (discussing photocopying). There is some merit in 
Rosenfield's credibility argument. United States Representative Stanford Parris of Virginia, for 
one, has termed the Ninth Circuit's Betamax decision as "the latest example of idiocy in the 
federal judiciary," Fortune, Feb. 1982, at 126, and humorists have poked considerable fun at the 
image of persons being arrested in their homes for misusing their living-room videorecorders. 
However, arguments premised on custom and expectation can easily be drawn too far. Among 
other things, the circumstances that gave rise to the custom can be changed; the ridicule that the 
Betamax result has occasionally drawn in the popular press might have been avoided if the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had focused on whether the courts could so change the economic 
arrangements that enforcement would not necessitate impractical court actions against each 
individual user. Of course, this might be implicit in the posture of the case. The only individual 
home user who was named as a defendant in the Betamax was not a real target of that litigation: 
rather he was "a client of plaintiffs' Jaw firm" who "consented to being a defendant," and 
against whom plaintiffs had "waived any claim for damages or costs." Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F.Supp. 429, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part and 
remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
Nevertheless, the popular perception of the case was probably quite influenced by the Ninth 
Circuit's refusal to make consideration of relief (i.e., whether changes in the technology or market 
structure would occur to make user fees easy to collect in a nonintrusive manner) part of its 
consideration of liability. See generally the discussion of the Betamax case infra text accompany-
ing notes 289-322. 
125. Calabresi and Melamed, in their seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, supra note 38, made it clear that the law has many 
choices, not only as to who should possess an entitlement, but also as to how such an entitlement 
should be protected. The modes of protection include "property rules" such as injunctive 
remedies, and "liability rules" such as damage remedies. When the owner's entitlement is 
protected by property rules, he may sell his right at a price of his choosing, or may refuse to sell. 
But when his entitlement is protected by liability rules, the owner may not preveht an involuntary 
transfer; rather he will be permitted to collect a court determined price (i.e., damages) for the 
value of the rights he has lost. Calabresi and Melamed write: 
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who 
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary 
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller •... [O]nce 
the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value .• , . 
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an 
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule. 
Id. at 1092 (footnote omitted). The grant of monetary relief in place of an injunction for 
copyright infringement would be an example of a liability rule. Whether the copyright law permits 
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It may be costly to society to give an author injunctive control over a 
work in a market failure situation since that might completely prohibit a 
defendant's use.126 Enforcement limited to a damage remedy, award of 
profits, or reasonable royalty127 might provide a mechanism for transferring 
revenues from user to author while simultaneously allowing utilization of the 
work. Such a court-dictated transfer might carry far less economic and social 
cost than would rules that force a choice between forbidding all involuntary 
transfers or leaving involuntary transferors without a remedy. By imposing a 
"price" for the use, the court award might itself "cure" market failure. 128 
It may be asked, however, whether courts should abandon the traditional 
all-or-nothing choice between enforcement and fair use bequeathed to them 
by fair use precedent. There are limitations on judicial expertise; whether the 
courts themselves are the apprcpriate institutions to "cure" market failure by 
inventing methods of compulsory transfer or by setting copyright prices is a 
very real question.129 Further, an objectively determined "price" is always less 
satisfactory to a property owner than a price of his own choosing and is 
usually a less reliable indicator of value for society's purposes as well. 130 Were 
the courts to feel free to substitute one for the other, an accelerating erosion 
of the market system could be triggered. From the point of view of copyright 
owners (and thus from the point of view of society's need to maintain overall 
incentives), a system that permitted certain limited uncompensated takings to 
occur, as long as they did not cause substantial injury, might be preferable to 
a system in which compensation was guaranteed but only after the fact. 
In addition, copyright law has traditionally made compulsory licenses 
(the equivalent of "reasonable royalty" determinations) a matter for legisla-
tive action.131 Compulsory licenses have been hard-fought political issues, 132 
the substitution of a liability rule for a property rule is a matter of debate. See, e.g., Nimmer, 
copyright liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 Va. L. Rev. 
1505, 1530-31 (1982) (arguing in favor of court-imposed royalty). 
126. Although a bargain can often be struck in which enjoined parties pay those holding the 
injunction to Jet them proceed, market failure may make this impossible in a given case. See 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1118-19. 
127. Such alternatives have been widely discussed. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 
13.05[E], at 13-91 to 13-92; Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as 
the Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 193, 233-44 (1980); Stanford Note, supra note 121, at 
257-62. 
128. See supra notes 125-27. 
129. The Williams & Wilkins court questioned the judiciary's abilities and authority in this 
regard. See infra notes 271 & 273. 
130. See sources cited supra note 59. 
131. Compulsory licenses appear at, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 11 l(d) (Supp. IV 1980) (cable 
television), id. § 115 (phonorecords), id. § 116 Gukeboxes). A Copyright Royalty Tribunal has 
been created, inter alia, to review and adjust statutory royalty rates. Id. § 801. The courts' role in 
reviewing such rates is limited. Id. § 810 Gudicial review). An exception to this general approach 
appears in the 1976 Copyright Act in regard to innocent infringements that may be traced to the 
copyright holder's omission of a notice of copyright. The omission of notice may itself cause 
market failure, for a potential user would not know copyright is claimed. See supra text accompa-
nying note 74. Congress has given the courts in that context the power to impose a reasonable 
license fee as a condition to continued use of the copyrighted materials. Id. § 405(b). 
132. See, e.g., Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright 
Law Revision Studies pts. 5-6 (Comm. Print 1960). See also House Report, supra note 10, at 
175-78 (compulsory licensing provisions for cable television). 
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for whose resolution Congress would appear to provide the most appropriate 
forum. Thus, although judicial regulation of copyright markets is not un-
known, 133 and although Congress is often slow to act in this area, 134 it may be 
unwise to advocate judicial adoption of an alternative to fair use that asks 
courts essentially to restructure markets or to set prices for the use of copy-
righted material. 
E. Burden of Proof 
Much debate today centers on whether the defendant or plaintiff should 
have the burden of proving injury. 135 The copyright statute does not state 
where the burden of proving injury or any other fair use factor should be 
placed, and Congress apparently preferred to leave this issue to the courts. 136 
133. See A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 455-58 (discussion of the protracted 
antitrust litigation, brought by the government and CBS against the licensing practices of ASCAP 
and BMI). The result of these judicial proceedings has been a series of consent decrees. Id. 
134. The 1909 Copyright Act survived with only piecemeal revisions until 1976. A draft bill 
for the comprehensive revision that became the 1976 Act was first introduced in both houses in 
1964. See House Report, supra note 10, at 47-50. However, it should be noted that Congress may 
act more quickly in response to the Betamax controversy; bills have been submitted and hearings 
have been held. See, e.g., 24 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 577-78 (Oct. 7, 1982). 
135. There is a substantial disagreement among the scholars about the nature and allocation 
of the burden of proving injury in fair use litigation. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 
13.05[E][4][c], at 13-82 to 13-86; Comment, supra note 104, at 869-84. 
The courts also disagree about the character of this burden. In Williams & Wilkins for 
instance, the court wrote: 
To us it is very important that plaintiff has failed to prove its assumption of 
economic detriment, in the past or potentially for the future. One of the factors always 
considered with respect to "fair use," ... is the effect of the use on the owner's 
potential market for the work. This record simply does not show a serious adverse 
impact, either on plaintiff or on medical publishers generally, from the photocopying 
practices of the type of NIH [National Institutes of Health] and NLM [National Library 
of Medicine]. In the face of this record, we cannot mechanically assume such an effect, 
or hold that the amount of photoduplication proved here "must" lead to financial or 
economic harm. This is a matter of proof and plaintiff has not transformed its hypothet-
ical assumption, by evidence, into a proven fact. 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). 
Similarly, the district court in the Betamax case noted that "plaintiffs ask the court to find 
harm." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 451 (C.D. Cal. 
1979), rev'd in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 
(1982) (No. 81-1687). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit rejected this approach to allocating the 
burden: "[Proof of actual damages] is simply too great a burden to impose on copyright 
plaintiffs." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). See also Encyclopedia Britannica 
Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[T]he burden of 
establishing fair use is on the defendant and ... the plaintiff in a copyright case is presumed to 
suffer irreparable injury."). 
136. The 1965 copyright revision bill had a fair use section that provided, in its entirety, that 
"the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright." Although this early 
version of § 107 more than quadrupled in length on its way to enactment in 1976, the basic 
characterization did not change. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1980). The Register of Copyrights said 
about the early § 107: 
The author-publisher interests have suggested that fair use should be treated as a 
defense, with the statute placing the burden of proof on the user. The educational group 
has urged just the opposite, that the statute should provide that any nonprofit use for 
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A market approach can provide some insight into how the burden of proof 
should be allocated. 
As discussed earlier,137 the copyright law appears to be premised on the 
assumption that functioning markets exist for copyright works. When such 
markets exist, injury will normally follow upon infringement and, even if the 
precise dimensions of that injury are hard to prove, it makes sense that lack of 
explicit proof of injury will be excused. 138 The congressional decision to 
provide plaintiffs the option of minimum statutory damages139 reflects this 
sentiment and suggests that the plaintiff should have no initial burden of 
disproving fair use. 140 Instead, the defendant should have the initial burden of 
proving that market failure exists and that it will continue to exist even if a 
judgment of liability were to be tendered. In addition, if his use serves no 
social purpose, then he could not satisfy the second part of the fair use test 
and further consideration of his fair use claim would be unwarranted. There-
fore, he also should be required to prove that his use serves some social 
purpose, 141 and to demonstrate the nature and extent of the public interest 
that is served. 142 
educational purposes is presumed to be a fair use, with the copyright owner having the 
burden of proving otherwise. We believe it would be undesirable to adopt a special rule 
placing the burden of proof on one side or the other. When the facts as to what use was 
made of the work have been presented, the issue as to whether it is a "fair use" is a 
question of law. Statutory presumptions or burden-of-proof provisions could work a 
radical change in the meaning and effect of the doctrine of fair use. The intention of 
section 107 is to give statutory affirmation to the present judicial doctrine, not to change 
it. 
Register of Copyrights, 89th Cong., lst Sess., Supplementary Report of the Register of Copy-
rights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill 28 (Comm. Print 
1965). 
137. See supra notes 62-87 and accompanying text. 
138. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1053. 
139. Section 504(c) of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980) provides plaintiffs the option of electing 
statutory damages in lieu of proving actual damages in an infringement action. The election of 
statutory damages may be made at any time before judgment is entered. Id. By electing statutory 
damages, the copyright owner may recover between $250 and $10,000 for any one infringement by 
any one infringer, the sum to be determined by the court. Id. § 504(c)(l). Greater or lesser 
amounts may be awarded in certain circumstances. Id. § 50l(c)(2). According to Nimmer, this 
statutory damage option is made available because "[i]t is inherently difficult in copyright 
infringement actions for a plaintiff to prove actual damages as against a given defendant." 
Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1053. 
140. See Nimmer, supra note 9. 
141. Since defendant is a member of society, ordinarily his use will have some social value. 
This will not always be true, however. One case in which the defendant's use had no apparent 
social value is Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc. 431 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 
1977). Amana, in an effort to counteract a critical Consumer Reports appraisal of its microwave 
ovens, had published a brochure featuring a full paragraph from an earlier, more favorable, 
Consumer Reports evaluation. Consumers Union requested that Amana withdraw the brochure 
and Amana responded by bringing an unfair trade practice claim. Consumers Union defended on 
the ground that the brochure was deceptive, and counterclaimed that Amana had violated the 
Consumer Reports copyright. Finding that in publishing the brochure Amana "was attempting to 
convey the impression that [Consumers Union] approved of [Amana's] microwave oven as of 
1973 when the exact opposite was true," id. at 326, the court dismissed Amana's defense of fair 
use to the counterclaim and issued in injunction barring any further distribution of the brochure. 
Id. at 327. 
142. Even when defendant's use has some social value, that value must be significant enough 
to outweigh plaintiff's injury. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text. 
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When severe market failure is present, injury to the copyright owner may 
not follow from infringement.143 If the proof of severe market failure offered 
by the defendant leads the court to doubt that injury will be present, it is 
legitimate for the court to demand evidence from the copyright owner that 
such injury would indeed follow. The burden of going forward with proof of 
injury should then shift to plaintiff. The harm he has suffered or anticipates is 
an area that should be peculiarly within plaintiff's knowledge.144 
Fair use has been variously regarded as a "defense,"145 as a "privi-
lege,"146 or as a use that is noninfringing. 147 Given the ambiguous nature of 
fair use, it might be argued that the court could appropriately demand some 
proof of injury from plaintiff even in the first instance. 148 This Article does 
not go so far; it suggests that, on a case-by-case basis, a court should ask 
plaintiff to come forward with evidence of probable harm when the court has 
drawn an inference, from defendant's proof of market failure or from other 
sources, that no injury is likely. Moreover, since it is defendant who seeks to 
show that the conditions of his use are so unlike those contemplated by the 
copyright scheme that fair use is warranted, the ultimate burden of persuasion 
on this issue should rest with him. 
F. Summary 
An analysis of the economic functions served by copyright and of the 
internal dynamics of the copyright statute has suggested a three-part test for 
fair use: first, does a reason to mistrust the market appear?; second, is the 
transfer to defendant value-maximizing, as determined by weighing plaintiff's 
injury against defendant's social contribution?; third, if both the first and 
second conditions are satisfied, would a grant of fair use cause substantial 
injury? If it would not, and if the prior conditions are satisfied, then fair use 
should be awarded. Defendant user should prove the existence of market 
failure and the social merit of his use. If defendant meets these burdens and 
I43. See infra note 22I (relation between types of injury and fair use). 
I44. A particular party's access to proof on an issue is, of course, often advanced as a reason 
for putting the burden as to that issue on him. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 104, at 869. 
I45. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 4I7 F. Supp. 120I, I213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds, 560 F.2d 106I (2d Cir. I977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
I46. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 304, 306-07 
(2d Cir. I966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See also Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of 
Copyright, 6 ASCAP Copyright L. Symp. 43, 45-48 (I955). 
I47. See Cohen, supra note 146; Comment, supra note 104, at 87I-75. Section 107 provides 
that fair use "is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra 
note I36. 
I48. In a suit for unintentional torts, the plaintiff has to show that defendant's acts were 
wrongful and that he (plaintiff) was injured. It can be argued that fair use acts as a repository for 
these elements of a plaintiff's cause of action when market failure calls into question whether the 
user justifiably bypassed the market and whether injury occurred. See supra text accompanying 
notes 55-61. 
See also Comment, supra note 104, at 869, which argues that harm from photocopying is 
improbable and courts should therefore require plaintiffs to prove economic injury in the photo· 
copying context. 
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raises a significant doubt as to whether harm is likely, then plaintiff should 
come forward with a showing of injury. 
If the market failure in a given case is likely to be cured (and substantial 
revenues generated) by the parties' own actions following a finding of in-
fringement, fair use should be denied. However, if the only possible "cure" is 
through a complex, court-imposed structure of monetary remedies and limited 
injunctive relief, both fair use tradition and the inherent limitations of the 
judicial process suggest that the court should hesitate before attempting such a 
task. It may be appropriate to leave the responsibility for restructuring the 
parties' economic relationships to the parties or to Congress. Analytically, 
however, it should be recognized that the market considerations underlying 
the three-part test could trigger a damage remedy or market restructuring, 
rather than fair use, in a court that is inclined to engage in such intervention. 
The three-part test proposed here, while not previously articulated in so 
many words, reveals itself in many of the decisions reached by the courts in 
the copyright area, and, as will be seen, serves to unify the various factors that 
courts and the statute have made relevant to fair use determinations. The 
remainder of this Article will explain how this test finds expression in the cases 
and statute, will analyze the Williams & Wilkins opinion, which gave the 
fullest expression to the test, and will examine how the Betamax court could 
have proceeded had it accepted these criteria. 
Ill. EVIDENCE OF A MARKET .APPROACH IN EXISTING AUTHORITIES 
This Article has suggested that a court will ordinarily not grant a defend-
ant fair use treatment unless the facts of the case give reason to mistrust the 
market.149 This section will review cases and authorities in which recurring 
patterns of such mistrust appear to have guided courts in the fair use area. The 
discussion will show that courts and, in following their lead, Congress, have at 
times grappled with a market approach, that such an approach is reflected in 
the traditional fair use factors, and that, were the courts to embrace the 
market approach more fully, a more effective and consistent use of the 
traditional factors would result. 
A. Inquiries Into Market Breakdown Under the Traditional Fair Use Ap-
proach 
1. Market Barriers: New Technologies and Other Applications. As previ-
ously discussed, the impossibility or difficulty of achieving a market bargain is 
a factor that may justify a grant of fair use. The relevance of market barriers 
to fair use is implicitly reflected in the legislative history of section 107 of the 
Copyright Act. The Senate Report to the new copyright act states that "[a] 
key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in fair use is whether or not 
the work is available to the potential user,"150 so that the out-of-print status 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91. 
150. Senate Report, supra note 26, at 64. 
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of a copyrighted work may help to justify fair use. 151 This is consistent with a 
market approach, since markets cannot form where goods are unavailable. 152 
Similarly, the Guidelines for Educational Fair Use in the House Report single 
out for fair use treatment instances of classroom photocopying in which 
bargains are particularly unlikely to occur because the teacher's use is sponta-
neous, individual and unsystematic.153 One of the prerequisites for making 
multiple copies under the Guidelines is that "[t]he inspiration and decision to 
use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness 
are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a 
request for permission." 154 
A particular type of market barrier is transaction costs. As long as the 
cost of reaching and enforcing bargains is lower than anticipated benefits 
from the bargains, markets will form. If transaction costs exceed anticipated 
benefits, however, no transactions will occur. 155 Thus, the confluence of two 
variables is likely to produce a market barrier: high transaction costs and low 
anticipated profits. New technologies are likely to present both high transac-
tion costs and, where uses by individual scholars or in individual homes are at 
issue, correspondingly low anticipated profits. This may explain why the 
"personal," "individual" nature of copying has been held relevant to fair 
use, 156 and why "home use" may be relevant to the reach of copyright law .1u7 
Consider, for example, the impact of the photocopy machine or the tape 
recorder. Each makes it possible for individuals to make use of copyrighted 
works in new and potentially valuable ways. From the point of view of the 
individual user, the anticipated "profit" is likely to be small, so his use will be 
151. Id. In a given case, the out-of-print status of a work can trigger market failure, yet fair 
use would be inappropriate because allowing uncompensated use would injure the copyright 
owner's future market for a second printing. Recognizing the separability of the two issues to 
which out-of-print status can be relevant-the issue of market failure-can clarify some of the 
current ambiguity over the matter. Compare Senate Report, supra note 26, at 64, with, e.g., 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The fact that the Rosenberg letters have 
been out of print for 20 years does not necessarily mean they have no future market which can be 
injured."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
152. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 
n.14 (5th Cir. 1980) ("If the copyrighted work is out of print and cannot be purchased, a use may 
be more likely to prevail on a fair use defense.") (emphasis added) (citing Senate Report, supra 
note 26, at 64 ("Availability of the work")). 
153. See House Report, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
154. Id. at 69. 
155. Of course, if an outside party like the government bears the transaction costs, the 
parties will not be prevented from achieving their bargain, but an inordinate amount of transac-
tion costs might then be imposed on society. While shifting the burden of transaction costs may be 
appropriate in some circumstances, the focus here instead should be on reducing these costs. 
156. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1355 (Ct. Cl. 1973) 
("personal, individual focus" of the photocopy), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975) (per curiam). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (small 
commercial establishment using home radio receiver to bring music to customers held not to be 
"performing" and thus not liable for copyright infringement). 
157. The home use of audio tape recorders has been referred to as "fair use." See remarks of 
Rep. Kastenmeier quoted in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 
446 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 
S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
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easily discouraged by transaction costs. Also, the technology's novelty may 
mean that the participants have no established market channels to rely on, so 
that the purchase of permission is likely to be cumbersome and expensive. 
High transaction costs and low per-transaction profits will converge. From the 
point of view of the copyright owner, the costs of enforcement against a 
diffuse group of individuals might outweigh anticipated receipts. A custom of 
use without payment will easily arise in such contexts unless the transaction 
costs of seeking permission or of enforcement are in some way reduced. 
In such situations, transaction costs are likely to prevent at least some 
value-maximizing transfers from occurring158 if the copyright is enforced. At 
the extreme, enforcing the owner's rights might eliminate the use, and thus 
bring no income to the owner and deprive society of the benefit of the 
technology. For this reason, new technologies may become the subject of fair 
use treatment. 
New technologies do not always involve market barriers, however, and 
thus do not always merit fair use consideration. In a case where a county 
educational program was videotaping educational television programs, the 
systematic and centralized nature of the copying and the various market 
alternatives that were present made license and purchase agreements quite 
possible.159 The court there denied fair use treatment at least in part because 
of this possibility.160 Thus it is the absence of a market and the prospect that 
such a market may form that is important, not the technological nature of the 
use. 
The role of transaction costs also explains those cases that rely on the 
copyright owner's apparent or likely consent in granting fair use. 161 Where a 
transfer is likely to be in the mutual interest of both owner and user, the courts 
158. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 63, at 316-18 ("[S]ome 
potential users, willing to pay royalties but unwilling to pay the transactions' costs, will not obtain 
the copyrighted item."). The discussion in text relates to a common point made by lawyer-
economists. A market works to transfer resources to their highest-valued resources. R. Posner, 
supra note 33, at 1-13, 27-31. Professor Coase has argued that when transaction costs are absent, 
it does not matter where the legal system assigns rights to the resources. Where transactions can be 
conducted costlessly, resources will gravitate naturally to those willing to pay the most for them, 
through a series of consensual exchanges. Coase, supra note 40. When transaction costs are high, 
on the other hand, some economists argue that rights should be assigned so as to promote the 
allocation of resources to their highest valued use. See R. Posner, supra note 33, at 34-39. Where 
transaction costs may be quite high in relation to the gain to be anticipated from transfers, fair use 
operates to make sure that certain uses are placed (without need of purchase) in the hands of those 
who value them most. 
159. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1177-78 
(W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
160. The availability of the copyrighted works was one of the key grounds used by the court 
to distinguish Williams & Wilkins. Id. at 1177. See also the court's prior opinion in granting a 
preliminary injunction, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). 
161. These cases are discussed infra notes 224-40 and accompanying text. Note that the 
focus in such cases is on whether a copyright owner is likely to have actual reasons for being 
willing to allow the use, or on whether he has manifested such a willingness; in such cases, the 
defendant "can justify himself upon some principle consistent with the entirety of ownership 
which the author has in his copyright." Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325, 327 (W.D.Pa. 1884). Likely 
consent reflects not just a measure of social welfare but also the fact that the copyright owner will 
not be injured. 
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appear unwilling to deter such transfers by imposing the costs of obtaining 
actual consent.162 
2. Externalities, Nonmonetizable Interest, and Noncommercial Activi-
ties. An analysis of the limitations of markets can also illuminate the special 
status that certain uses, such as scholarship, have in fair use tradition. The 
costs and benefits of the parties contracting for the uses often differ from the 
social costs and benefits at stake, so that transactions leading to an increase in 
social benefit may not occur.163 Thus, for example, a critic of the Warren 
Commission's investigation of the Kennedy assassination might write a "seri-
ous, thoughtful and impressive"164 book that will further public interest more 
than the revenues of his book alone would indicate. One might say that 
publication of his book gives an "external benefit" to persons who might gain 
knowledge from the public debate sparked by the book without having pur-
chased the book itself. Similarly, teaching and scholarship may yield signifi-
cant "external benefits"; all of society benefits from having an educated 
citizenry and from advances in knowledge, yet teacher salaries and revenues 
from scholarly articles are arguably smaller than such benefit would warrant. 
When a defendant's works yield such "external benefits," the market cannot 
be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable transac-
tions.165 
162. Without fair use, the necessity of obtaining consent might wastefully apply even to 
those defendants whose activities would have been objected to by no one. The reason for this 
potential waste is that the availability of injunctive relief and statutory damages provides a motive 
for objecting, once a use has been made, even to those copyright owners who would have been 
inclined to consent ab ante. Once an injunction is obtained, the owner controls not merely the use 
of his own work, but also all aspects of defendant's work that are intertwined with it. Sec 17 
U.S.C. § 502 (1976) (injunctions); id. § 503 (impounding and disposition of infringing articles). A 
great deal will then be at risk for the defendant, who might be willing to settle at high cost in order 
to lift the injunction and proceed with his enterprise. Also, the statutory damage provisions will 
ordinarily give a neglected copyright owner from $250 to $10,000, see id. § 504(c), and there is a 
potential for costs and attorneys' fees. See id. § 505. Thus, even a copyright owner who would 
have been willing to consent to a use if his permission were sought before the use commenced 
might bring suit if the use had begun without that permission. Potential users would be unable to 
distinguish between those likely-consenting owners who would later object and those who would 
not. This possibility could in turn compel potential users to expend resources in negotiating for 
consent even from the willing. To award fair use where a typical copyright owner would be likely 
to consent breaks this circle. 
Consider by analogy the hold-out problem that sometimes arises when a builder needs to 
purchase many individually owned tracts of land in order to accomplish a planned project. The 
problems caused by strategic hold-out behavior have been cited as justification for granting the 
government power to condemn property via eminent domain. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 38, at 1089. The injunctive and other modes of relief just discussed may give a copyright 
owner hold-out power over a defendant's work, and this may provide some justification for 
granting defendants the power to make use of the copyright owner's property via fair use. But see 
Demsetz, supra note 48, at 300 ("[S]o long as firms are free to compete for the trade of buyers, 
this [hold out] issue will reduce to a problem of wealth distribution and not to a problem of 
efficiency."). 
163. See supra notes 32-87 and accompanying text. 
164. See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
165. For more thorough explanations of externalities, see, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 33, at 
48-52; N. Singer, supra note 38, at 107-15; E. Mansfield, supra note 65, at 70-71, 74-75, 336-37. 
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In cases of externalities, then, the potential user may wish to produce 
socially meritorious new works by using some of the copyright owner's mate-
rial, yet be unable to purchase permission because the market structure pre-
vents him from being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized. Though 
such inability would not itself justify fair use, it may signal to the court that it 
should investigate whether the social costs of relying on the market are 
unacceptably high. It is therefore not surprising that section 107 of the Copy-
right Act, which addresses fair use, lists several uses that potentially exhibit 
positive externalities, such as "teaching," "scholarship," and "research," 
among the uses for which fair use may be given. 166 
Section 107 also directs the courts to consider "the purpose and character 
of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes."167 Where the defendant does not seek to 
earn profits, it may be argued that his willingness and ability to pay for the 
copyrighted resources he uses will not provide an accurate measure of the 
public interest served by his use. Distinctions between profit and nonprofit 
entities or commercial and noncommercial uses must, however, be employed 
with great caution. Henry Hansmann has suggested that nonprofit organiza-
tions can be fully participating members of the market process. 168 Conversely, 
even commercial uses can face market failure. 169 
Distrust of the market may also be triggered when defendant's activities 
involve social values that are not easily monetized. When defendant's use 
contributes something of importance to public knowledge, political debate, 170 
or human health, 171 it may be difficult to state the social worth of that 
contribution as a dollar figure. If the defendant's interest impinges on a first 
amendment interest, relying upon the market may become particularly inap-
propriate; constitutional values are rarely well paid in the marketplace and, 
while the citizenry would no doubt be willing to pay to avoid losing such 
values, it is awkward at best to try to put a "price" on them.172 Not surpris-
166. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1976). 
167. Id. 
168. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835 (1980). 
169. See WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 2075, 2078-79 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (need to 
maintain impartiality may preclude copyright owner from selling films of its news stories to 
subjects of such stories). 
170. See, e.g., Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 
957, 959-60 (D.N.H. 1978) (portion of political opponent's campaign music incorporated into 
political advertisement); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (theory concerning Kennedy assassination). Note that in the latter case defendants had 
"offer[ed] to surrender to [the copyright owner] all profits of [the defendants] from the Book as 
royalty payment for a license to use the copyrighted Zapruder frames [of the Kennedy assassina-
tion], id. at 146, thereby further underlining the nonmonetizable nature of the concerns at stake. 
171. Consider in this regard the solicitude shown by the Court of Claims for medicine and 
science in Williams & Wilkins, discussed infra text accompanying notes 249-88. 
172. Since a society may hold conflicting values, it may be incapable of weighing the 
importance of its various goals by any constant measure. See generally G. Calabresi & P. Bobbit, 
supra note 34. 
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ingly, it has been suggested that fair use be granted when first amendment 
issues are involved.173 
While in all of the cases described in this section-those involving exter-
nal benefits, noncommercial uses, and nonmonetizable values-reason exists 
to distrust the market, it may be particularly difficult to determine whether the 
breakdown is substantial enough to frustrate the purposes for enforcing copy-
rights. What one deals with here may be not only traditional market failure, in 
the sense that conditions of perfect competiton have failed, but also a court's 
perception that the criterion of economic "value" is itself flawed. 174 This 
concern is not illegitimate, but it should not be extended to make the copy-
right law an instrument of income redistribution. The courts should thus take 
care that they do not tax copyright owners to subsidize impecunious but 
meritorious users under the guise of maximizing value. 175 Only when the 
public interest to be served is great, and the damage to the owner small, does 
the need for this caution diminish. 
3. Anti-Dissemination Motives. Section 107 places first among the pur-
poses for which fair use is appropriate "criticism" and "comment," uses that 
a copyright owner might be reluctant to license.176 Similarly, the treatment of 
burlesques and satires, which can be considered types of commentary, has 
been a volatile subject of fair use law. These uses share a type of market 
failure that helps to explain their fair use treatment and that is particularly 
important in a field where advancement of knowledge is the ultimate goal. 
The case law has tended to grant fair use treatment where copyright owners 
seemed to be using their property right not for economic gain but to control 
the flow of information. 
The usual economic assumption is that the owner of a resource will either 
exploit that resource himself, or will sell it to someone else who will. The 
173. Several commentators and courts have discussed the possibility that the first amend-
ment may place a limitation on enforcement of the copyright owner's market rights or that fair 
use may embody some first amendment principles. See, e.g., Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. 
Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 959-60 (D.N.H. 1978); Denicola, supra note 39. 
Note that the copryight law itself provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protection extend to 
any idea,'' 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976), a principle that operates regardless of injury to the 
copyright owner. 
At least one district court has held that the first amendment could defeat an infringement 
suit. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 
1978), aff'd on grounds of fair use without reaching first amendment issue, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th 
Cir. 1980). More common is the position that, while cases demanding the adoption of an express 
first amendment limitation on copyright may theoretically or eventually arise, "[c]onflicts be-
tween interests protected by the first amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been 
resolved by application of the fair use doctrine." Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street 
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 
(1978). See generally A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 473-74 (discussing, inter alia, 
those cases that have rejected first amendment defenses). 
174. See supra note 36. 
175. This may be the nature of Seltzer's concern when he warns the courts against engaging 
in reallocation of costs. See L. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 38. 
176. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1976). 
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owner of a copyright, however, may not be willing to exploit all of the 
possible derivative works over which his copyright would ordinarily give him 
control. Even if money were offered, the owner of a play is unlikely to license 
a hostile review or a parody177 of his own drama; a publicity-shy tycoon who 
owns the copyright on magazine articles discussing his life is unlikely to license 
a biographer to use these articles;178 a candidate for governor is unlikely to 
license his copyrighted campaign music to be utilized in his opponent's tele-
vised advertisement;179 and the publisher of a periodical is unlikely to license 
his competitor to use his copyrighted magazine covers in comparative adver-
tising.180 Because the owner's antidissemination motives make licensing un-
available in the consensual market, and because the free flow of information 
is at stake, a strong case for fair use can be advanced in these cases. 181 Thus, it 
has often been suggested that burlesques and satires of copyrighted works 
deserve generous fair use treatment, since the copyright owners are unlikely to 
produce or license such work themselves. 182 
It might be argued that allowing fair use to criticisms, satires, and other 
materials that are potentially hostile to the copyrighted work will undermine 
incentives to produce original work. But while criticisms and the like may 
indeed reduce an owner's receipts, the goal of copyright is to generate incen-
tives for the production of works that satisfy consumer tastes. If a criticism 
reveals a work's flaws, it is appropriate that demand for the work should 
decrease. 183 
177. "It has been held that an author is entitled to more extensive use of another's copy-
righted work in creating a parody than in creating other fictional or dramatic works .... " 
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 
1980) (citations omitted). 
178. In Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), Howard Hughes, having purchased through the Rosemont 
corporation the copyright on articles concerning his life, sought to restrain a biographer's use of 
the articles. "[I]t appears that the fair use defense was upheld in Rosemont at least in part because 
the court found that the plaintiff there was acting in bad faith seeking to prevent the publication 
of a legitimate biography of Howard Hughes." Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 
1977) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
179. See Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 
{D.N.H. 1978) {fair use granted to political opponent's use of copyrighted material). 
180. In Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th 
Cir. 1980), the publishers of the Miami Herald had shown old TV Guide covers as part of 
advertisements comparing TV Guide with the Herald's television supplement. TV Guide's motiva-
tion for refusing permission to use these covers would seem to be related not to a desire to exploit 
those covers' aesthetic qualities, but rather to a desire to prevent consumers from being persuaded 
by the ads. When TV Guide brought suit, fair use was found. 
181. See cases and statute cited supra notes 176-80. 
182. See, e.g., A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 484-85; M. Nimmer, Comments 
and Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, appended to 
Latman Study, supra note 102, at 42, 43. Sheldon Light valuably put this argument into an 
explicit economic framework. Light, Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copy-
right, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 615 (1979). 
183. Of course, an injury to a copyright owner arising out of increased consumer knowledge 
would not be injury relevant to the second or third parts of the test. Copyright law seeks to guard 
against decreased demand for the copyright owner's product arising out of substitution; when 
decreased demand arises out of changed consumer preferences, that should be reflected in 
decreased revenues. See A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 485 (raising a similar issue). 
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Criticism is valuable, inter alia, because the market works to further the 
social good only when consumers have accurate information about the goods 
available. As the Supreme Court has written: "So long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in 
large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It 
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be . . . well 
informed." 184 A similar public policy argument would encourage the taste-
changing functions of burlesque and satire.185 For these and other forms of 
criticism, fair use is particularly appropriate when the owner's reluctance to 
license use of his work is motivated by the desire to restrict the flow of 
information. 
In discussing instances where copyright owners' antidissemination mo-
tives186 trigger a distrust of the market, however, it must be stressed that 
refusals to grant permission to license should ordinarily be honored. A refusal 
to license must not automatically justify a right to fair use; markets can 
function only if owners have a right to say "no" as well as "yes."187 When an 
owner refuses to license because he is concerned that defendant's work will 
substitute for his own work or derivative works, 188 the owner is representing 
not only his own interest, but also the interest of his potential customers and 
thus the public interest.189 Market failure should be found only when the 
defendant can prove190 that the copyright owner would refuse to license out of 
a desire unrelated to the goals of copyright-notably, a desire to keep certain 
information from the public. 191 Unfortunately, some courts seem to have 
viewed even some legitimate refusals as justifying fair use treatment. 102 A 
184. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S 748, 765 (1976). 
185. Economics seeks to satisfy consumer tastes, however they may evolve, and assumes 
"that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life." R. Posner, supra note 33, at 3. 
186. Such motives might in an extreme case be termed "bad faith," reflecting on the 
equitable origins of the fair use doctrine. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
187. See Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982). 
188. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 
351, 360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) ("The Court first recognizes that a non-parodic or non-satiric stage 
version of [plaintiff's work] Gone With the Wind is a protected derivative use of the original 
works which only the holders of the valid, existing copyrights in such works have a right to 
exploit .... [Defendant's play] 'Scarlett Fever' could harm a potential market for or value of a 
stage version of Gone With the Wind."). 
189. But see Goldstein, supra note 39, at 1056 ("The infringer is ... the sole proponent of 
the generalized interest in access .... "). 
190. On the allocation of the burden of proof, see supra text accompanying notes 135-148. 
191. It should also be noted, however, that while fair use may be appropriate when copy-
rights in published works are improperly used for the purpose of manipulating public debate, fair 
use should not be used to force disclosure of works that the author has heretofore kept secret. The 
right to privacy that found expression in the "right of first publication" in common-law copy-
right, see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70, should still be honored, at least for truly private 
works such as undisclosed diaries and the like. See Senate Report, supra note 26, at 64 ("The 
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited •... "). But sec M. 
Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05 n.2, at 13-54. 
192. In New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 
1977), the court refused, on fair use grounds, to enjoin defendants from producing an index that 
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clearer focus on whether the nature of the reluctance to license involved 
market failure could help avoid this problem. 
Even though the presence of antidissemination motives signals a reason 
to mistrust the market, a market breakdown is not always the result. Where, 
for example, a potential satirist plans a remunerative commercial use whose 
popularity will depend in part on the attractive or dramatic qualities of the 
original being satirized, he may be willing to offer a substantial payment for 
the right to use elements of the copyrighted work in a satirical form. The 
copyright owner might accept such payment in the expectation that it should 
more than compensate him for any loss he might experience in his primary 
market as a result of the satirical treatment. If a market bargain would be 
possible, fair use should be denied 193 unless the court perceives a danger that 
the owner might use his market right to distort the satiric content. 
Several factors already employed by the courts and Congress are relevant 
to the inquiry into whether a bargain for a use could take place. As men-
tioned, the commercial nature of the use is important, 194 as is substantiality .195 
The more commercial the nature of the use, and the more the defendant's 
work will compete with the copyrighted work, the greater the impact of any 
given quantity of copying is likely to be. 196 Also, anticipated profit-the 
incentive for a market bargain-is more likely to be high where the taking is 
extensive. These criteria in turn can have an impact upon the court's assess-
ment of substantiality. 197 If despite the theoretical possibility of an anti-
dissemination motive the court feels that a market bargain could have been 
reached, or that the defendant is operating in a realm that the copyright owner 
himself might have been willing to exploit, 198 fair use should be denied. 
the copyright owners had declined to publish. The court was influenced by the plaintiff's 
unwillingness to publish a work like that produced by defendants, even though the plaintiff's 
unwillingness may have stemmed from a desire to protect its own derivative works. Cf. Roy 
Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. I980), ("[I]f the 
Roxbury court did consider harm to the potential market of derivative work to be irrelevant to a 
determination of the availability of the fair use defense, ... we disagree .... "), aff'd, 672 F.2d 
1095 (2d Cir. I982). Similarly, in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 
I968), the owner of copyright in the Zapruder photographs of the Kennedy assassination denied 
permission to use the pictures. The denial did not come out of any antidissemination motive (e.g., 
to restrain criticism of the Warren Commission), but rather out of a desire to exploit the 
photographs economically. While there may have been some impropriety in plaintiff's plans for 
"monopolizing" the films, see Goldstein, supra note 39, at 986-88, 1035-55, it is preferable to 
view the market failure in Geis as not involving an antidissemination motive. The case is better 
viewed as involving an externality or nonmonetizable interest. See infra text accompanying notes 
I63-75. 
193. This is what appeared to occur in the Benny case. See infra notes 22I & 223. 
194. See I7 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. IV I980). 
195. See id. § 107(3). 
196. See id. § 107(4). 
I97. See Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, 13I F. Supp. I65, I84-85 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub. nom. 
Benny v. Loew's, Inc. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. I956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court 
sub nom. CBS v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
198. See also WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 2075, 2079 n.9 (N.D. Ga. I982) (issue 
of whether "plaintiff[] [television station's] copyright market inherently excludes" use in question 
held relevant to market impact factor of fair use). 
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B. Assessment of Injury and Benefit 
The courts generally speak of "balancing" or "weighing" in the fair use 
area without employing any coherent methodology for determining how the 
various factors thrown into the pot-such as public interest and injury to the 
copyright owner-should be addressed. 199 The fair use test presented here can 
clarify that process by suggesting, first, that "public interest" cannot provide 
a justification for fair use unless there is a reason to believe that the market 
cannot be relied upon to serve that interest; and second, that where the market 
cannot be relied upon, market measures for comparing an owner's loss with a 
user's gain can provide some objective guide to determining where the public 
interest lies. Since the courts' amorphous handling of injury and benefit 
already reveals patterns that are consistent with the fair use test advanced 
here, the test in turn may serve to clarify the existing case law. It is therefore 
worthwhile to explore further some aspects of how the second part of the 
instant fair use test finds expression in the cases. 
1. Defendant's Interest. The fair use test presented here requires that in 
order to warrant consideration for fair use protection the defendant's use 
must have some positive social value. 200 The cases do indicate that fair use will 
be denied where the court perceives the defendant's use to be without value, as 
where the defendant is using the copyrighted work for the purpose of achiev-
ing a deception, e.g., falsely to indicate that the author of the copyrighted 
199. Often the balancing concept employed in the cases is more diffuse than that applied in 
the second part of the fair use test set forth here. This Second Circuit statement is fairly typical: 
"The fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with 
the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as 
art, science and industry." Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 
91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977). For examples of the courts' assessments of injury and benefit see Mceropol 
v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. 
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
Some cases do directly weigh the copyright owner's loss against the public benefit, but even 
there it is unclear at what stage weighing becomes relevant. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis 
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed supra note 192. 
200. Only the social value of those parts of defendant's work that need to use plaintiff's 
work is relevant here. It is necessary to evaluate not just the value of defendant's work, but also 
whether he needed to use plaintiff's work to achieve that value. See Roy Export Co. Estab. of 
Vaduz v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (in assessing the purpose and character 
of defendant CBS's use, "[t]he jury could reasonably have concluded that if .•. it was essential 
to proper coverage of [Charlie] Chaplin's death that some film clips be shown, the showing of 
excerpts from films in the public domain would have been sufficient, and that CBS's decision to 
broadcast the offending version was motivated by commercial rather than educational consider-
ations"), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1982) (assessing defendant's claim of a first 
amendment privilege in the copyright field) ("The showing of copyrighted [Chaplin] films was not 
essential to CBS's news report of Charlie Chaplin's death or to its assessment of his place in 
history; public domain films were available for the purpose, and the public is already generally 
familiar with his work."). See also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-59 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (evaluation of "necessity" in parody situations), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1132 (1979); 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 n.14 (2d Cir. 1977) ("necessity for verbatim copying"), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). See also Denicola, supra note 39, at 306-13 (necessity in the 
first amendment context). 
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work has endorsed the user's product.201 If, on the other hand, the use has 
value, the courts will consider its nature and measure its importance. 2o2 
It may seem inconsistent that courts are willing to evaluate the public 
interest or worthiness of defendant's work in the fair use context, yet are 
unwilling, when granting protection in the first instance, to investigate 
whether plaintiff's work is "worthy" of copyright or, in the constitutional 
phrase, likely to "Promote the Progress of Science. " 203 But, in light of the 
comparatively limited application of fair use doctrine, the distinction is defen-
sible. If ,authors were required to prove the intellectual or aesthetic virtues of 
their works in order to obtain copyright protection, the courts would be 
continually embroiled in hard questions about artistic and other measures of 
quality for which they are ill-equipped and for which the marketplace criterion 
of consumer demand might be a more appropriate measure.204 By contrast, 
the fair use inquiry into how greatly defendant's work serves the public 
interest, and how significantly that interest would be impaired if infringement 
were found, needs to be considered only if market failure has been proven.205 
Furthermore, the presence of market failure in fair use cases suggests that 
consumer demand will not be appropriately reflected in owner/user transac-
tions, so that the court may be the only institution capable of making the 
judgment. In addition, the case-by-case flexiblity of fair use allows the courts 
to weigh the value criterion in defendant's favor only when they do feel 
equipped to make such judgments. This judicial diffidence may explain why 
fair use is often found in certain recurring categories, 206 or in other instances 
where the public interest is quite obvious.207 
201. In Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage 
Prods., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. I98I), defendant corporation had marketed plastic busts of 
Dr. King, using the name of the Center for Social Change and using excerpts from Dr. King's 
copyrighted speeches in its advertisements and other materials. In rejecting the defendant's claim 
of fair use, the court noted that there was no "public interest consideration ... present in this 
case .... Defendants' use of substantial passages from Dr. King's creative works was purely to 
induce consumers to buy the plastic busts and to convey the [false] impression that the Center 
approved of the product. This is not a 'fair use.' " Id. at 861. See also Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 
v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 43I F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D Iowa I977) (deceptive 
use of quotations), discussed supra note 141. 
This consideration may also help to explain the court's decision in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air 
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1132 (1979), for the value of the 
defendants' depiction of "counter-cultural" lifestyle's may have been difficult for the court to 
perceive. This illustrates one danger of relying on a court's subjective measures of value. 
202. See generally A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 473-75 (suggesting that a 
" 'public interest' factor outweighing all others" may be developing that is "arguably bubbling 
under the surface of cases involving new technology"). 
203. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). In Bleistein, Justice 
Holmes wrote: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits." Id. at 251. See also Light, supra note 182, at 635-36 (a test for fair use 
should not allow a court to make literary evaluations of parodies and satires). 
204. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92. 
206. 
Whether the privilege [of fair use] may justifiably be applied to particular materials 
turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g., whether their distribution would serve 
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One unresolved question is whether defendant's work serves the public 
interest if it is primarily entertainment. 208 Some courts have suggested that 
entertainment has a social value, 209 while a recent opinion demanded that 
defendant show some additional claim to serving the public.210 An economic 
the public interest in the free dissemination of information and whether their prepara-
tion requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter. Conse-
quently, the privilege has been applied to works in the fields of science, law, medicine, 
history and biography. 
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
207. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
("There is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President 
Kennedy. [Defendant] Thompson did serious work on the subject and has a theory entitled to 
public consideration."). See also supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
208. It can be argued that entertainment has a social value as worthy of protection pro lanto 
as any other-which is the position taken by this Article-or that entertainment uses have no 
value entitled to fair use protection, see infra note 210, or that its value is not susceptible to 
judicial appraisal, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 
(C.D. Cal. 1979) (refusing to disqualify copyrighted "New Mickey Mouse Club" episodes from 
fair use treatment despite an unwillingness to evaluate their social merit), rev'd in part and 
remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982). Cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 551, 566 (1969) (for first amendment purposes, "[t]he line between the 
transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed 
such a line can be drawn at all"). 
209. Thus, the Second Circuit has seen social value in humor. See Elsemere Music, Inc. v. 
NBC, 623 F.2d 252, 253 & n.l (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (emphasis added): 
[I]n today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to 
the humor of parody .... A parody is entitled at least to 'conjure up' the original. Even 
more extensive use would still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original, 
using the original as a known element of modern culture and contributing something 
new for humorous effect or commentary. 
In the Betamax case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to base its holding of no 
fair use on the mere fact that the challenged uses served entertainment purposes. Although the 
Ninth Circuit noted that "there seems to be some indication that the scope of fair use is greater 
when informational type works, as opposed to more creative products, are involved," and that 
"[i]f a work is more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is less likely that a claim of 
fair use will be accepted," Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 
972 (9th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687), the 
court's opinion did consider the entertainment to be of some value and took that value into 
account pro tanto in making its fair use determination. Id. at 971. 
210. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 
35I (N.D. Ga. 1979), the owners and creators of "Scarlett Fever," a musical play based on Gone 
With The Wind, argued that their use of the copyrighted material was a parody or satire protected 
by fair use. The court rejected this contention, reasoning, inter alia, that 
in order to constitute the type of parody eligible for fair use protection, parody must do 
more than merely achieve comic effect. It must also make some critical comment or 
statement about the original work which reflects the original perspective of the paro-
dist-thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertainment function. 
Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). 
The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer took this position because it believed that "[o)therwise, 
any comic use of an existing work would be protected" from liability via the fair use doctrine. Id. 
However, recognizing that entertainment has social value would not entitle all comic works to 
immunity from liability, as the court supposed; under a market-oriented approach, fair use would 
not be available unless there were justification for departing from the market. Without that 
market failure, no amount of social value should justify free use. See supra notes 89-91 and 
accompanying text. 
It is true that a lack of critical comment or perspective should militate against fair use, but 
the reason is not that such work lacks all social value. Rather, if an alleged "parody" fails to give 
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analysis would consider entertainment to be valuable, for it is an object of 
consumer preference like any other. 211 However, it is likely that an entertain-
ment use will be able to pay its own way through the market, 212 so that market 
failure will less often appear in those contexts. 213 A commercial use like 
entertainment is also likely to cause more injury than a noncommercial one. 214 
Thus, while entertainment uses, like commercial uses, may serve the public 
welfare,215 where they are present the fair use test is unlikely to be satisfied for 
other reasons. 
2. Plaintiff's Interest. Injury to the plaintiff's market has long been 
considered the dominant factor in fair use adjudication.216 Injury most strik-
ingly results when a defendant advertises his work as a possible substitute for 
the copyrighted original.217 When a defendant uses plaintiff's copyrighted 
audiences a new opinion of the copyrighted work, fair use may be barred because there is no 
market failure, i.e., because there is nothing to indicate that the copyright holder would have 
refused to license this use of his work. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. In sum, the 
holding of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer court can be squared with the view advanced by this 
Article, that entertainment is a valuable use entitled pro tanto to fair use protection, if it is 
recognized that the court was using the language of social value to address whether a market 
failure appeared. Such an interpretation of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer fits the facts of the case: there 
was no suggestion that the holders of copyright interests in Gone With The Wind objected to 
defendant's production in order to prevent criticism of the famous work from reaching the public 
or had any other antidissemination motive. Rather, the inference was that plaintiffs were acting to 
protect their rights to license similar derivative works of their own. See 479 F. Supp. at 360-61. 
Since no market failure appeared, fair use was appropriately denied. 
211. Some courts appear to award entertainment a social value, but weigh it Jess heavily in 
the fair use balance than other uses. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguably took this 
position in the Betamax case, finding home television recording to be of some value but of less 
importance than the "serious damage to medical science" that concerned the Williams & Wilkins 
court. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
212. Entertainment is more likely to be able to recapture its social value in receipts than are 
the typical objects of fair use solicitude such as scholarship, and the monetary marketplace 
measures are likely to be more suitable gauges of the value of entertainment. See supra text 
accompanying notes 163-75. The courts often conflate the issues of whether a use encounters 
market failure and whether it has social value. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social 
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981) 
("Although the fact that a use of a work is for commercial gain will not automatically preclude a 
finding of 'fair use,' generally fair use will be more readily recognized where the defendant's use is 
for educational, historical, or scientific purposes."). 
213. To satisfy the first element of the fair use test presented herein, market failure must be 
shown. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
214. The presence of injury makes it more difficult to satisfy the second and third elements 
of the fair use test presented herein. See supra notes 92-103 & 104-124 and accompanying text. 
215. "Whether an author or publisher reaps economic benefits from the sale of a biographi-
cal work •.• has no bearing on whether a public benefit may be derived from such a work." 
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 
216. See M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-64 to 13-65; Triangle Publications 
v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980). 
217. See, e.g., Wainwright Secs. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 93-94, 96 
(2d Cir. 1977) (enjoining weekly newspaper that had regularly abstracted plaintiff's copyrighted 
research reports, and had advertised the availability of such abstracts as one of its strong selling 
points), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-71 (2d Cir. 
1977) (reversing summary judgment for defendants who used plaintiff's copyrighted letters 
without permission in book about plaintiff's parents), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). The 
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work in a way that competes with that work, fair use is particularly un-
likely. 218 Where the defendant's work reaches a market that the plaintiff has 
not yet tapped, however, the injury is less apparent and the case treatment has 
been disparate.219 The analysis presented here suggests that probable injury to 
those derivative work markets that plaintiff might exploit is relevant to deter-
mining whether or not a use is fair. 220 The defendant himself may be one of 
the plaintiff's potential customers,221 and computation of injury should in-
court in Meeropol noted that "[a]lthough these letters represent less than one percent of [defend-
ant's book], the letters were prominently featured in promotional material for the book," 560 
F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted), and "whether the book is bought because it contains the 
Rosenberg letters" may be considered, id. at 1071 n.14. See also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis 
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment denied on 
grounds of fair use where defendant author used sketches of copyrighted Zapruder films of 
Kennedy assassination as part of book criticizing the Warren Commission). The court in Geis 
considered the question of audience motivation quite relevant. In an opinion granting fair use 
treatment, the court found that "[t]he Book is not bought because it contained the Zapruder 
pictures ." 293 F. Supp. at 146. 
218. The more that is taken from the copyrighted work, the more likely is defc;ndant's work 
to substitute for the original, so that the amount of the taking is relevant to injury. One of the fair 
use factors listed in the statute is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (Supp. IV 1980). In the Betamax case 
compare the Ninth Circuit's view of the substantiality criterion, Universal City Studios., Inc. v. 
Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1981) ("'excessive copying precludes fair 
use'"; lack of market injury is "'immaterial'") (relying, inter alia, on the Benny case, see infra 
note 221), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687) with that of the district court, 480 F. 
Supp. 429, 454-56 (C.D. Cal. 1979) ("the substantiality factor is inextricably bound with the issue 
of harm"). The substantiality criterion is also relevant to market failure analysis, for with less 
substantial takings the impact of transaction costs on the market is likely to be greater and the 
amount of injury is likely to be less. See supra notes 31 (fair use factors) & 155-59 (transaction 
costs) and accompanying text. 
219. Compare New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 
1977) (harm to plaintiff from loss of potential derivative market for Times index insufficient to 
bar defendant's production of index) with Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 
1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (harm to derivative market for Chaplin film biographies, which plaintiff 
had already entered, argues against fair use treatment), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), both 
discussed supra note 192. 
220. This is also the view taken by the court in Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. CBS, 503 
F. Supp. 1137, 1145-46 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982). See also 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 360-61 (N.D. 
Ga. 1979) (discussed supra note 188). As indicated by WXIA-TV v. Duncan, P. Med. L. Reptr. 
2075, 2078-80 (N.D. Ga. 1982), a court should factually determine whether plaintiff does exploit 
or could exploit the market tapped by defendant. Antidissemination motives (e.g., the satire 
cases) or conflicts of interest (e.g., the WXIA case) may remove a use from potential exploitation 
by the copyright owner. 
221. A focus on this often neglected fact may clarify one source of persistent confusion in 
this area: the extent to which a finding of "no injury" should itself justify fair use. 
In the famous Benny case, Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub 
nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided 
Court sub nom. CBS v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), Jack Benny produced a fifteen-minute 
television skit that burlesqued the movie "Gaslight." He borrowed the movie's characters, plot 
development, setting, and even an appreciable amount of its dialogue. The district court held that 
the burlesque was an infringement, stating, inter alia, that 
[t]he mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copyrighted work will not 
make a use fair. The right of a copyright proprietor to exclude others is absolute and if it 
has been violated the fact that the infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of 
the work or pecuniarily damage him is immaterial. 
Id. at 184 (emphasis added). However, the Benny court discussed only the effect of defendant's 
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elude the amount that the defendant would have paid for the work had he not 
bypassed the market. If defendant utilizes the copyrighted work for sale in a 
new market, those receipts provide some guide to what defendant might have 
paid.222 Similarly, if the defendant realizes a cost savings in using plaintiff's 
work as a building block for his project, the cost saved223 may provide some 
guide to what defendant would have paid and therefore to what plaintiff has 
lost. 
3. Balancing Under Consent Analysis. The role of consent has been the 
subject of some discussion in traditional fair use commentary.224 Several cases 
have found the copyright owner's apparent consent to favor a fair use hold-
ing,225 or have indicated that a custom of permitted use (i.e., a pattern of 
apparent consent among copyright owners) could favor fair use. 226 The impor-
tant study that Professor Latman prepared for the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary presented the consent of the reasonable copyright owner as a poten-
tial unifying principle, 227 but other commentary has dismissed consent analy-
ses as "fictional. " 228 
use on plaintiff's "sale or exploitation" to customers other than defendant himself, a factor that 
we might call "competitive injury." There is another potential type of injury: the loss of what 
defendant himself might pay to use plaintiff's work in his own projects, which we might call 
"building block injury." The mere absence of competitive injury should not justify fair use, not 
only because of the market failure requirement, but also because sufficient building block injury 
may be present to cause substantial injury to incentives. Building block injury will be absent only 
with complete market failure between copyright owner and user. 
After Benny lost the case, "trade rumour" reported that the copyright owners licensed Benny 
to use the material for $100,000. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and 
Humorous Commentary, 35 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 233 (1962). This suggests both that despite the 
burlesque form of the use, see supra text accompanying notes 193-98, there was no market 
failure, and that the "building block" receipts were substantial. See infra note 223. Infringement 
rather than fair use was the proper result. The court's language suggesting there was "no injury" 
is thus somewhat deceptive. 
222. This calculation is consistent with the successful copyright plaintiff's ability to recover 
profits as well as damages to the extent they do not overlap. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976). 
223. See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D. 
Minn. 1980) (defendant soliciting advertising and listings for new yellow pages directory sent 
prospective advertisers photocopies of such businesses' listings in the copyrighted Northwestern 
Bell yellow pages; preliminary injunction granted). The court in Northwestern Bell noted: 
"[W]hat a subsequent compiler cannot do is copy from an' already copyrighted directory and save 
himself the labor and expense incurred by the prior compiler." Id. at 302 (quoting Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 
1974)). 
In two leading companion cases, a television parody of the movie "Gaslight" that used most 
of that movie's plot elements was held an infringement, while fair use was granted to a parody of 
"From Here to Eternity" that depended less on the movie's own plot lines for interest. Compare 
Loe.v's, Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. 
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 
43 (1958) ("Gaslight"), with Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348, 350-58 (S.D. 
Cal. 1955) ("From Here to Eternity"). As mentioned supra note 221, the infringers of "Gaslight" 
must have considered the substantial building blocks borrowed from the movie to be of value; 
they reportedly purchased a license, after loss of the case, at a price of $100,000. 
224. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 146, at 45, 50-51. 
225. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text. 
226. See Cohen, supra note 146 at 43, 51-52, and sources cited therein; infra note 235. 
227. Professor Latman suggested: 
[T)he tests [for fair use) may perhaps be summarized by: importance of the material 
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Economic analysis helps to explain why apparent consent and custom 
may weigh in favor of fair use and also helps to delineate the limits of their 
applicability. As intimated earlier, hypothetical consent may serve as a useful 
model for balancing the injuries and benefits of a given copyright use. Cases 
in which courts have employed consent terminology provide implicit examples 
of such balancing and illustrate related economic principles.220 
A court is likely to find fair use when a copyright owner's behavior gave 
apparent consent to the use, even if that copyright owner never actually 
intended to allow the specific use in question.230 In such cases, consent is 
inferred from the plaintiff's actions; this inference is consistent with society's 
need to make its members responsible for their actions. 231 Since it is less 
expensive for persons who own copyrights to avoid misleading potential users 
than it is for users to seek explicit permission from all owners whose behavior 
has implied permission to use,232 a fair use holding in this context stimulates 
more economically desirable behavior than would a finding of liability. 233 
copied or performed from the point of view of the reasonable copyright owner. In other 
words, would the reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use? At times, 
custom or public policy defines what is reasonable. 
Latman Study, supra note 102, at 15. 
228. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05, at 13-55 (1980). 
229. This section discusses several types of consent. Apparent consent asks whether an 
individual copyright owner seems to have given his actual consent. "Likely" or "probable" 
consent (custom) asks whether an individual copyright owner, if asked, would give his consent. 
Hypothetical consent under the second branch of the fair use test asks if a copyright owner who 
was offered a perfect market price would consent. Each type of consent provides a mode of 
structuring the inquiry into whether social welfare is served by a transaction, so each is relevant to 
the second branch of the fair use test. In addition, facts that suggest the presence of apparent and 
likely consent indicate that little would be gained by insistance on a market bargain, so that they 
are relevant to the first part of the fair use test and, because consent indicates there is no injury to 
the owner, to the third part of the test as well. Apparent and likely consent thus serve as 
illustrations unifying the three parts of the test. 
230. See Karil v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (eight lines of a 
song written by a fan of the Green Bay Packers quoted in magazine articles about the team; 
songwriter's complaint against the magazine dismissed on grounds of fair use). The court stated, 
inter alia: "When the plaintiff dedicated the song to the Green Bay Packers, by implication at 
least he consented to a reasonable use thereof associated with the Packers." Id. at 837. Sec also 
American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (publisher of booklet 
of forms sued defendant who made 6 copies of one form apparently for use in architectural 
business; cover of the booklet stated: "The Institute's forms [are] intended for use in actual 
practice ... and ... may be drawn upon by architects in improving their own forms •.. "; 
summary judgment awarded to defendant on grounds of fair use). Note that in both Karil and 
Fenichel, apparent consent was only one of several factors relied upon. 
231. As Dean Prosser has written: 
Consent to an act is simply willingness that it shall occur. Actual willingness •.. 
will prevent liability ... even though the plaintiff has done nothing to manifest it to the 
defendant. But the converse is also true, that a manifestation of consent, upon which the 
defendant may reasonably rely, will be equally effective even though there is no willing-
ness in fact. In our society we must perforce rely upon the overt words and acts of 
others, rather than upon their undisclosed minds .... 
W. Prosser, supra note 99, at 101 (footnotes omitted). 
232. Most such owners will probably have intentions consistent with their actions, and 
seeking consent of the already-willing is wasteful. 
233. A fair use holding here also respects the reliance interests that equity concepts of 
fairness have ·long recognized. The goal of providing incentives to encourage economically 
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Although apparent consent may provide an acceptable basis for fair use, 
its absence should not trigger liability. Instead, the absence of apparent 
consent should merely make the court examine whether other justifications 
for market bypass may be present. Thus, posting an explicit "do not copy" 
warning on a book may negate a copyright owner's apparent consent. The 
"do not copy" warning would not, however, prevent a court from granting 
fair use of that work on grounds other than apparent consent, so that the 
courts' freedom to grant fair use despite such a warning does not render 
"fictional" the use of a consent rationale in appropriate cases. 
Just as judicial reluctance to stimulate needlessly expensive behavior may 
be at the core of the apparent consent cases, so too it may explain those cases 
in which the courts exhibit a sensitivity to whether a challenged use is mi-
nor ,234 or customary.235 Similarly, in instances where defendant's use is likely 
to yield the owner himself a net benefit, 236 such complements237 are likely to 
desirable behavior is relevant to the legal import of reliance in contexts other than fair use as well. 
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 33, at 67-70 (reliance in the contract context). 
234. Among the fair use factors listed in § 107 are "the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," and "the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3) & (4) (1976). The 
smaller the amount taken and the smaller the economic impact, the more likely consent would 
appear to be. 
235. Fair use has sometimes been described as that which is "reasonable and customary." 
Note, 15 S. Cal. L. Rev. 249, 250 (1942); Latman Study, supra note 102, at 7. See also Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); 
MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914). 
It is likely that the mass of fair use situations go unlitigated because owners willingly tolerate 
customary uses. A newspaper review that summarizes the plot of a reviewed play provides one 
classic example. Though widely presumed to be fair use, it is not a focus of much litigation itself. 
Presumably playwrights do consent to this use. Similarly, most scholars actively want their ideas 
to become part of the dialogue in their fields, even though participation in such dialogue might 
require them to tolerate colleagues quoting from and summarizing the expression of their copy-
righted work. Thus, in scholarly fields and reviews-two areas of fair use mentioned specifically 
by § 107-actual subjective consent is probably quite common. 
Custom may yield some information about the dominant expectations and incentives of a 
typical copyright owner in a given milieu and may suggest whether copyright owners similarly 
situated to the plaintiff in a given case would consent to a contested use. It is thus revealing on the 
issue of whether a typical copyright owner would consent. Also, disturbing the pattern of custom 
can be expensive. We have already seen, however, that while custom may be suggestive of fair use 
treatment, it cannot and should not be a sufficient basis for fair use standing alone. See supra 
notes 122-24 and accompanying text. Inter alia, circumstances that justified the custom may 
change, and silence on the part of copyright owners does not invariably signal willing acquies-
cence. 
236. Beneficial effects can take many forms. For example, defendant's work can provide 
publicity for the original. See, e.g., Karil v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. 
Wis. 1941): 
[I]t is very difficult to see how the value of the song could in any manner have been 
diminished by the article in question. Undoubtedly many thousands who read the article 
became aware for the first time of the existence of a musical composer by the name of 
Eric Karil [plaintiff]. 
See also Liebowitz, supra note 64, at 9-1 I. 
It has already been noted that copyright owners might be unwilling to license reviewers to 
produce potentially negative reviews, and that the presence of this possibility favors a grant of fair 
use when reviews are at issue. In addition, where the reviewers produce positive results for the 
owner, consent would appear likely. See Professor Latman's discussion of Karil and of the 
publicity value generally arising from reviews and criticism of scholarly works in A. Latman, The 
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receive fair use treatment. 238 In these cases, consent may be "implied" in the 
sense that the typical or reasonable copyright owner would probably consent 
to the use. 239 The cost in time and money of obtaining consent can be high, 
both in absolute terms (i.e., constituting a drain on resources) and in relative 
terms (i.e., high enough to discourage the creation of new works or socially 
desirable dissemination).240 The courts seem to be unwilling to require all users 
to undertake the cost of obtaining permission from likely-consenting owners; 
they may feel that such a price is too high to pay for the purpose of protecting 
that unusual owner who would object to a customary, minor, or beneficial 
use. 
Copyright Law: Howell's Copyright Law Revised and the 1976 Act 205 (5th ed. 1979). See also G. 
Ricardi & Co. v. Mason, 201 F. 182, 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (publicity value of defendant's 
work noted; motion for preliminary injunction denied), and 201 F. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (plain-
tiff's bill dismissed), aff'd, 210 F. 277 (2d Cir. 1913); Latman Study, supra note 102, at 7 n.14. 
However, the market failure aspect of reviews is present whether or not the review turns out to be 
favorable. Otherwise, the copyright owner's market right might be used as leverage to obtain 
unwarranted positive reviews. 
Where the primary function of defendant's work is to give increased access to plaintiff's 
work, this increased access may bring a benefit to plaintiff or at least indicate the noncompetitive 
relationship between the two works. See New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. 
Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant's index that was compiled from the New York Times 
Index, held to be fair use and thus not violative of copyright in the New York Times Index). 
Among the other factors the Roxbury Data court found relevant was the noncompetitive nature 
of the two works: 
The effect of defendants' personal name index on the market for the Times Index 
appears slight. Since defendants' index carries citations only to the New York Times 
Index, defendants' index is useless unless its user has access to the Times Index, from 
which he will be directed to the articles appearing in the New York Times . . • . 
[P]urchase of defendants' index in no way supersedes the need for plaintiffs' index ... , 
Id. at 223-24. 
This sensitivity to the economic relation between works is consistent with a general sensitivity 
to the function of works. See the discussion of function in M. Nimmer, supra note 97, at § 
13.05[B], at 13-65 to 13-72. 
237. Traditionally, liability for copyright infringement has been found where copyrighted 
works are used in ways that compete with their originals. However, two related goods need not be 
substitutes; they may also be "complements," such that production of one good makes the other 
more desirable. Substitutes and complements can be exemplified as follows: 
[B]utter and margarine are substitutes because a decrease in the price of butter will result 
in a decrease in the quantity demanded of margarine-many margarine eaters really 
prefer the "higher-priced spread." On the other hand ... gin and tonic may be 
complements since a decrease in the price of gin may increase the quantity demanded of 
gin, thus increasing the quantity demanded of tonic since gin and tonic tend to be used 
together. 
E. Mansfield, supra note 65, at 149-50. Complements exhibit negative cross-elasticity of demand; 
that is, availability of a complement increases demand for the product. On the other hand, 
positive cross-elasticity is exhibited by substitutes; that is, availability of a substitute generally 
decreases demand for the product. Determination of whether goods are complements or substi-
tutes is empirical, based on observation of market forces. Id. Complementarity should favor fair 
use. I am indebted to Warren F. Schwartz here. 
238. See supra note 236. 
239. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
240. As noted previously, if the costs of doing business (including transaction costs) exceed 
the anticipated benefits, business will not be done. The result may be that a socially useful work 
will not be produced. Consider in this regard Judge Breyer's discussion of the impact that the 
inconvenience of obtaining consent can have on a scientist's use of prior works. Breyer, The 
Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 63, at 316-18. 
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In all of these cases, apparent and expected consent act as a substitute for 
an actual market transaction, indicating that there is no social loss or injury to 
plaintiff from defendant's use. If transaction costs would inhibit transfers 
where consent is likely, fair use is an appropriate response. More specifically, 
in such contexts the second part of the fair use test advocated in this Article is 
satisfied. 
C. Substantial Injury Hurdle 
Courts do not ordinarily separate the balancing and substantial injury 
inquiries, although it would probably be agreed that "[h]arm which 'imperils 
the existence of a publication' is more destructive of a fair use defense than is 
harm which would 'limit profits.' ''241 Several courts have demonstrated a 
sensitivity to the ultimate issue of whether allowing defendant's use would 
erode incentives.242 For the reasons discussed above,243 it would be desirable 
for the two issues to be separately identified and separately considered in the 
future. 
The economic analysis required by the substantial injury test can aid in 
integrating the first two parts of the fair use test with traditional fair use law. 
For example, incentive analysis can help to distinguish between those cases in 
which a custom of uncompensated use indicates the market can be safely 
bypassed and those instances in which honoring a custom of such use would 
harm the copyright scheme. An inquiry into potential market cures, as man-
dated by the substantial injury hurdle, allows a court to determine whether the 
circumstances that gave rise to the custom are subject to change, and whether 
the copyright owners' apparent acquiescence indeed indicates they have no 
objection to a given use. Without such an inquiry, reliance on custom could 
bar copyright owners from obtaining needed remuneration, especially for 
modes of use arising from newly-developed technologies. 
Similarly, the identification of market barriers for out-of-print works 
should be supplemented by an incentive analysis.244 If allowing an uncompen-
sated use would seriously prejudice a developing reprint market in such books, 
fair use would be inappropriate. Courts have recognized the market-impact 
dimension of the out-of-print problem, without a clear focus on its market-
241. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. 
Cal. 1979) (citing Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 497, 509 n.53 
(1976-77)), rev'd. in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 
2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687). 
242. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1013 (1978); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1174 
(W .D.N. Y. 1982) ("Fair use must be reasonable .... [I]t is not reasonable to drive plaintiffs from 
the educational television market."); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 
(S.D. Cal. 1955) (by implication). 
243. The substantial injury hurdle embraces a broader category of injury than does the 
balancing element of the fair use test, and serves different purposes. See supra text accompanying 
notes 108-24. 
244. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text, discussing the out-of-print problem in 
connection with market barriers. 
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failure aspect. 245 Application of the third phase of the market test would serve 
to reconcile solicitude for the copyright owners' economic interest in out-of-
print works with the Senate Report's apparent concern for maintaining access 
to these materials. 
A model that demonstrates a unification of the three fair use concerns 
presented here appears in the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copy-
ing in Non-For-Profit Educational Institutions.246 The Guidelines are simulta-
neously concerned with brevity, spontaneity, and the cumulative market effect 
of copying. For example, under the Guidelines, copying that is extensive in 
quantity or involves "works intended to be 'consumable' in the course of 
study or of teaching'' would not be fair use even if spontaneous and not 
capable of effectuation in the market. 247 The Guidelines represent only "the 
minimum standards" for fair use; the three-part test can serve to structure the 
fair use inquiry concerning classroom use outside of the Guidelines' parame-
ters. 24s 
Overall, the discussion in the preceding sections reveals that incentive 
analysis can provide a useful addition to the framework for the cases that have 
grappled with market-oriented approaches to fair use. Now that the nature of 
the connection between the three-part test and the statute and case law has 
been explored on a general level, the discussion will turn to two particular 
scenarios to allow for a more detailed explanation of fair-use analysis. 
IV. CASE STUDIES FOR FAIR-USE ANALYSIS 
Both of the cases that follow are relevant to the discussion because they 
address instances in which the grant of fair use might be favored by public 
opinion, but the grant is controversial when viewed from a traditional fair use 
perspective. In Williams & Wilkins, the first case studied, the court implicitly 
attempted to use a market approach; in the second, the Betamax case, this 
market approach was rejected. This reveals some confusion as to the role of 
both the market approach and the traditional fair-use factors, which might be 
alleviated if the inchoate doctrinal approach of the fair use cases were reform-
ulated as suggested here. The discussion that follows will suggest how appro-
priately to apply a market-based test to the Williams & Wilkins and Betamax 
situations. 
245. See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 
n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d I061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. I013 
(1978). 
246. House Report, supra note IO, at 68-70, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
at 5681-84. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text, discussing the Guidelines in the 
context of market barriers. 
247. House Report, supra note IO, at 69, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 
5685. Such copying could have a significantly adverse effect on the copyright owner's market. 
248. House Report, supra note IO, at 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 
5684 ("the purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum standards of educational 
fair use .•. there may be instance in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines • , . 
may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use"). That the Guidelines were arrived at 
through interest-group bargaining also suggests the appropriateness of a consent-based analysis. 
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A. Williams & Wilkins 
In Williams & Wilkins, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed 
without opinion a decision by the Court of Claims that extensive library 
photocopying could constitute fair use. The Court of Claims opinion249 im-
plicitly made use of the approach recommended in this Article. It will be 
useful to apply to that opinion-called "the leading case in the application of 
the [fair use] doctrine to noncommercial copying"250-the three-part test 
described herein, both to illustrate the application of that test and to under-
stand the nature of the decision. 
The facts were these: Publisher Williams & Wilkins Company charged 
that its copyrights in four medical journals were being infringed by the 
photocopying efforts of two United States government libraries, the technical 
library of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Library of 
Medicine (NLM). The government conceded that at least one photocopy had 
been made of eight articles published in one or more of the journals, 251 but the 
court's focus was not on those particular copies. Rather, it viewed itself as 
passing judgment on the libraries' entire photocopying practice. In 1970, NIH 
made approximately 93,000 photocopies of articles for supply to the NIH 
research staff.252 In 1968, a "representative year,"253 NLM filled approxi-
mately 120,000 requests254 from other libraries, government agencies, and 
private or commercial organizations255 seeking photocopies of articles.256 The 
249. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). The Court of Claims had reversed the 
trial court's decision that the United States was liable for infringement, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 
(Ct. Cl. 1972). 
250. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 
1978). The decision in Williams & Wilkins preceded the 1976 congressional revision of the 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980)). As part of the 1976 Act, and in response to the reaction of librarian groups 
following the commencement of the Williams & Wilkins suit, Congress enacted 17 U .S.C. § 108 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), which provides a structure within which much library photocopying is 
legally permissable. A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 519-20. "Section 108(d) might be 
said to codify the rule in Williams & Wilkins." Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1056 n.21. Nimmer 
notes, however, that the impact of § 108(g)(2) is unclear. That subsection denies protection to 
"systematic reproduction" of a work, and appears to be responsive to market failure and injury 
concerns. 
Section 108 provides that "[n]othing in this section ..• in any way affects the right of fair 
use." 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). But the relationship between§§ 107 and 108 
is the subject of some debate. See, e.g., A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 519. Despite 
the statutory changes, "[t]he court's analysis in Williams & Wilkins . .. remains valid today as to 
questions left open by the new Act." Encyclopaedia Britannica, 447 F. Supp, at 251 n.8. But see 
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1359 (ambiguous meaning of "copy" under 1909 Act relevant to 
fair use finding). See also infra note 273. 
251. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1349. 
252. Id. at 1348. 
253. Id. at 1349. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. ("[A]bout 12 percent of the requests came from private or commercial organiza-
tions, particularly drug companies."). 
256. Id. "Both institutions normally restrict copying on an individual request to a single 
copy of a single article of a journal issue, and to articles of less than 50 pages." Id. at 1354. 
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Court of Claims held that this photocopying activity was protected by fair 
use. 2s1 
Application of the three-part test first requires identification of possible 
market failure. As discussed earlier, 258 the existence of a noncommercial use 
may signal a potential market failure, as may the presence of a value such as 
human health that is not easily monetized. These elements were present in 
Williams & Wilkins, for the court stressed that "scientific progress, untainted 
by any commercial gain from the reproduction, is the hallmark of the whole 
enterprise of duplication."259 Medicine is traditionally a well-paying field, 
however, and while research may not be as lucrative as practice, the court did 
not suggest that the photocopy users would fail to be rewarded monetarily for 
the increase in their skills and accomplishments resulting from their use of the 
copyrighted work. It is therefore best to look elsewhere for evidence of market 
failure. 
In the Court of Claims's perception, no satisfactory market would form 
for the valuable medical uses made possible by photocopying if photcopying 
ceased.260 The court believed that the articles desired would not be available 
for purchase261 or that the items desired would not be available except if tied 
to the purchase of other, expensive items.262 But these availability problems 
become important only if no market for paid photocopies would evolve. As a 
dissenting opinion pointed out, 263 it is unclear why the majority felt that 
photocopying itself would cease being available if the plaintiff publisher were 
given the judgment of liability it was seeking. 
The majority's assumption that photocopying would cease may rest on 
another type of market defect: high transaction costs.264 If each person seek-
257. Id. at 1362-63 and passim. Note that the libraries' self-imposed restrictions (e.g., a 
refusal to provide articles from recent and widely-available journals to certain users, id. at 1355) 
were important to the court's finding of fair use. Id. at 1354-56. 
258. See supra notes 163-75 and accompanying text. 
259. 487 F .2d at 1354. The court also stressed the "personal, individual focus" of the 
photocopying. Id. at 1355. Such personal uses may be more readily discouraged by transaction 
costs. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60. 
260. 487 F.2d at 1356-57. 
261. Id. at 1356 ("[t]he supply of reprints and back numbers is wholly inadequate"). See 
also id. at 1357 & n.17 (plaintiff itself gives notice that it does not stock back issues). 
262. Id. at 1357. 
263. Id. at 1371 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting): 
The court has bottomed its decision to a very large extent on its finding, which is not 
disputed, that medical science would be seriously hurt if the photocopying by defend· 
ant's libraries is entirely stopped. But the court goes further and concludes that a 
judgment for plaintiff would lead to this result. It is not altogether clear to me how the 
court arrives at the' second conclusion, and I think it is based on unwarranted assump-
tions. 
264. See the discussion of transaction costs supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text. See 
Goldstein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 21 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 204 (1974) (recognizing the transaction cost problem but 
arguing it should not have justified fair use in that case). In addition, the majority seemed to fear 
that a finding of infringement would lead courts in other contexts, via stare decisis, to enjoin 
photocopying. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1360. Judge Nichols, in dissent, suggested that 
such injunctions would not necessarily follow. Id. at 1386-87 (Nichols, J ., dissenting), In any 
event, even were an injunction to issue, it might not permanently stop an activity-the prevailing 
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ing a photocopy were required to bargain with the copyright owner, the costs 
and inconvenience of bargaining would prevent many of the uses from being 
made.265 Thus, if conventional modes of bargaining were the only tools 
available with which to effect transfers, markets might fail to form, and a 
holding of infringement might end photocopying. 
Conventional one-on-one bargaining is not the only alternative, however. 
Many commentators and plaintiffs themselves had suggested that enforcing 
the plaintiff's copyright would not preclude a continuation of photocopy-
ing. 266 It was argued that a licensing royalty system or clearinghouse might 
arise, 267 reducing transaction costs to a bearable level, so that plaintiffs could 
be paid and defendants could have use of the copyrighted material. Chief 
Judge Cowen in dissent presented this position, arguing that a market in 
photocopies would exist after a judgment of liability, either by means of a 
reasonable royalty paid via license or by means of clearinghouses, or a combi-
nation thereof. 268 
The majority was unwilling to consider these possible market cures. 269 It 
doubted whether the licensing plan suggested by plaintiff would have been 
"viable,"270 "whether a ... clearinghouse system can be developed without 
legislation, and if so whether it would be desirable, " 271 and it declined to 
consider author willingness to license.272 The majority also felt that the 1909 
party, on whose behalf the injunction issues, may be able to sell the enjoined party a right to 
continue his activity. See Stanford Note, supra note 121, at 248-49. A determination of whether 
such a market would evolve following an injunction is relevant to assessing substantial injury. See 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 38, at 1116. 
265. Some of the duplication of effort inherent in such individual transactions might be 
reduced if the library made the bargaining arrangements, but even then the transaction costs 
might be prohibitively high. Thus, "[d]efendant suggested at trial that payment of compensation 
to plaintiff for photocopying its journals would create a continuing undue and oppressive 
administrative and financial burden on NLM and the NIH library." Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d 
at 1384 (Cowen, C.J ., dissenting). Whether or not the transaction costs would in fact have been 
"oppressive" was not fully resolved; in the opinion of Chief Judge Cowen, the record did not 
justify defendant's fears. Id. at 1384-85. 
266. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1360-61. The potential role of licensing and clearing-
houses has been explored by many scholars. See, e.g., M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 
13.05[E][4][e], at 13-90 to 13-92 (discussing a possible judicial role in the creation of compulsory 
licenses). 
267. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1372, 1378-79 & n.12, 1384-86 (Cowen, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
268. Id. See also id. at 1385 n.17. 
269. It did, however, consider whether a market cure might evolve if plaintiff's copyright 
were not enforced as to photocopies: "It has been suggested ... that publishers now have the 
power to adopt the intermediate solution of charging more for subscriptions sold to libraries or 
other entities which engage regularly in photocopying." Id. at 1360 n.26 (emphasis added). 
The court placed this unevaluated and seemingly casual suggestion in a footnote rather than 
addressing the issue more directly and vigorously. If the copyright owners would be able to 
capture photocopy income even without a liability judgment, that would be relevant to determin-
ing what injury the owners would suffer from a fair use holding. 
Professor Demsetz has suggested that price discrimination is consistent with efficiency in 
markets for public goods. See Demsetz, supra note 48, at 300-06. See also Liebowitz, supra note 
64, at 12-17 (discussing price discrimination in journals). 
270. 487 F.2d at 1360. See also id. at n.24. 
271. Id. at 1360 n.24. "The possible intermediate solutions are also of the pragmatic kind . 
legislatures, not courts, can and should fashion." Id. at 1360. 
272. Id. 
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Copyright Act foreclosed a court from imposing a licensing system. 273 This 
attitude contrasted with Chief Judge Cowen's dissent, which considered it 
quite relevant that an award to plaintiff "may very well lead to a satisfactory 
agreement between the parties for a continuation of the photocopying by 
defendant upon payment of a reasonable royalty to plaintiff. " 274 
In sum, the majority opinion in Williams & Wilkins premised its holding 
on the questionable assumption that certain valuable uses would have to cease 
if liability were imposed, or at least that there was a high risk that no adequate 
market would evolve to disseminate the copyrighted works and the socially 
valuable information they contained to the desired extent.275 It was in the 
context of this assumption that the court made its assessment of harms and 
benefits. 
In broad outline, the court's approach to costs and benefits followed the 
pattern recommended here. The majority balanced the harm that would be 
imposed on medical science by a decision in favor of liability276 with the harm 
that would be imposed on the publisher by a finding of fair use,277 and 
concluded that the "balance of risks" was on defendant's side.278 This implic-
itly satisfied the second branch of the fair use test described herein.279 The 
majority also concluded that the publisher would suffer no "serious adverse 
impact,"280 a conclusion that, if true, would satisfy the substantial injury 
hurdle that is the third part of the fair use test.281 A closer look at the court's 
analysis, however, reveals flaws in its approach. 
273. "[U]nder [the 1909 statute] ... we have the choice only of thumb's up or thumb's 
down, for the photocopying practice involved in this litigation, without any real Congressional 
guidance. Intermediate or compromise solutions are not within our authority." Id. (footnote 
omitted). But see M. Nimmer, supra note 97, § 13.05[E][4][e], at 13-82 to 13-86. 
In addition to the general limitations of copyright law that might affect other courts, the 
Court of Claims lacked the power to enjoin governmental libraries. 487 F.2d at 1346 n.l. See 28 
iJ.S.C. § 1498 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
274. 487 F.2d at 1372 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting). 
275. Id. at 1360, 1362-63. 
276. Id. at 1356-57, 1362-63, and passim. 
277. Id. at 1357-59. 
278. Id. at 1359. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103. Note, however, that the court declined to 
prescribe a general rule using balancing methodology: 
[O]ur holding rests upon this record which fails to show a significant detriment to 
plaintiff but does demonstrate injury to medical and scientific research if photocopying 
of this kind is held unlawful. We leave untouched, because we do not have to reach 
them, the situations where the copyright owner is shown to be hurt or the recipients (or 
their interests) would not be significantly injured if the reproductions were ruled to 
infringe. • 
487 F.2d at 1362-63. This is consistent with the Court of Claims's overall reluctance to state 
general rules in this case: 
[T]he conclusion that defendant's particular use ... has been 'fair' rests upon all of 
the elements discussed [in a previous portion of the opinion] and not upon any one, or 
any combination less than all. We do not have to, and do not, say than any particular 
component would be enough .... Conversely, we do not have to, and do not, say that 
all the elements we mention are essential .... 
Id. at 1362. 
280. Id. at 1359. 
281. See the discussion of the substantial injury hurdle, supra text accompanying notc;s 
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The majority's opinion recognized that the first step in the balancing 
process is the determination of whether defendant's use serves public wel-
fare. 282 Given the nature of medical research, the court had no trouble with 
this inquiry. The court then discussed how this interest would be hurt (i.e., 
what benefits would be lost) if liability were imposed; unfortunately, the court 
concentrated this discussion on an examination of how medical science would 
be affected if photocopying were ended. 283 As seen above, however, it is not 
certain that an end to photocopying would indeed have followed from a 
judgment of liability. The failure to consider the possibility that photocopying 
might continue under royalty arrangements overstated the amount at stake for 
medical science. 
The court's evaluation of harm to plaintiff is also questionable in some 
respects. In particular, the court refused to include in its assessment of plain-
tiff's injury the potential photocopy royalty income that the plaintiff might 
have received if its copyright were enforced. The court wrote: 
It is wrong to measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of presumed 
royalty income-a standard which necessarily assumes that plaintiff 
had a right to issue licenses. That would be true, of course, only if it 
were first decided that the defendant's practices did not constitute 
"fair use." In determining whether the company has been suffi-
ciently hurt to cause these practices to become "unfair," one cannot 
assume at the start the merit of the plaintiff's position .... 284 
By contrast, the economic approach to fair use presented in this Article begins 
with the premise that a copyright owner is ordinarily entitled to revenue for all 
substantial uses of his work within the statutorily protected categories. 285 Both 
fairness to the copyright owner and economic efficiency demand that the 
assessment of his injury include the loss of the revenues he would receive in 
the market were his entitlement to be enforced. If the market would not fail 
fully after a finding of liability, the plaintiff would be able to serve the public 
interest by selling his work at least to some extent. If such revenues were 
possible in substantial amounts, then their presence or absence could have a 
significant impact on the copyright owner's incentives and his patterns of 
104-24. The court found that the record failed to "show a serious adverse impact, either on 
plaintiff or on medical publishers generally, from the photocopying practices of the type of NIH 
and NLM." 487 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis added). The court was thus looking to the impact of its 
decision on the marketplace as a whole, which is consistent with the substantial injury hurdle. See 
supra text accompanying notes 115-24. 
282. 
Whether the privilege may justifiably be applied to particular materials turns initially on 
the nature of the materials, e.g., whether their distribution would serve the public 
interest in the free dissemination of information and whether their preparation requires 
some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter. 
487 F.2d at 1352-53 (quoting Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 
(2d Cir. 1966)). 
283. "There is no doubt in our minds that medical science would be seriously hurt if such 
library photocopying were stopped." Id. at 1356. See supra notes 260-75 and accompanying text. 
284. 487 F.2d at 1357 n.19. 
285. Certain uses are not within protected categories at all, of course. See generally 17 
u.s.c. § 106 (1976). 
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production.286 To deny consideration to such potential revenues would be to 
place impossible burdens on most plaintiffs,287 rendering them incapable of 
demonstrating the substantial injury that might follow from a grant of fair 
use. 
Thus, although the Williams & Wilkins decision evidences a concern with 
market failure similar to that discussed here, the opinion suffers from a lack 
of an articulated and coherent rationale.288 An explicit focus on the issues of 
market failure, balancing and substantial injury would have eliminated some 
of the pitfalls discussed above. Nevertheless, the debate between majority and 
dissenters in Williams & Wilkins focused properly not on formalistic ques-
tions, but on key issues such as whether or not markets would form. In doing 
so, the judges of that court addressed one of the central questions in the 
debate over whether copyright law can be adapted to the new technologies. 
B. The Betamax Case: Intrinsic Uses 
In the Betamax case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court judgment 
that home videorecording constituted fair use.289 In doing so, it strongly 
criticized the district court for using" Williams & Wilkins Co. 's distortions of 
the fair use rationale."290 The "distortion" that primarily disturbed the Ninth 
Circuit was the Court of Claims's willingness to extend fair use treatment to 
the use of a work "for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be called the 
'ordinary' use of it. " 291 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Leon Seltzer's 
contrary view that fair use generally should deal only with " 'the use by a 
second author of a first author's work.' " 292 It also intimated that it accepted 
Seltzer's belief that "ordinary" use by photocopying and videorecording 
" 'triggers questions of reallocation of costs,' " 293 that such questions should 
be dealt with in specific exemptions rather than by fair use, and that they are 
thus "matters for Congress, not the courts. " 294 
Turning initially to the proposition that "ordinary" use is not within the 
proper ambit of the fair use doctrine, one finds that the copyright statute itself 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24. 
287. The court put a burden of demonstrating detriment on the plaintiff. 487 F.2d at 1359. 
This Article has suggested that this burden should be placed on the plaintiff only where the 
defendant has made a convincing showing that the market between owner and user is so unlikely 
to function properly that the assumptions underlying the statutory damage provisions arc under-
mined. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text. The Court of Claims's allocation of the 
burden indeed arose in part from the court's perception that the situation failed to conform to any 
perfect market model. 487 F.2d at 1358-59. But the court's insufficient consideration of market 
structure left in doubt whether the market failure was sufficiently likely or severe to justify this 
crucial shift in burden. 
288. See supra note 279. 
289. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), 
modifying 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982) (No. 81-1687), 
290. Id. at 970 (emphasis omitted). 
291. Id. at 970 (quoting L. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 24). 
292. Id. (quoting L. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 24 (emphasis omitted)). 
293. Id. at 971, (quoting L. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 38 (emphasis omitted)). 
294. Id. at 971. 
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specifically embraces at least one "ordinary" use among the examples for 
which fair use is appropriate: "multiple copies for classroom use" find ex-
plicit shelter under section 107. 295 In addition to the explicit wording of section 
107, legislative history shows Congress treating photocopying and recording 
as legitimate subjects for resolution under the fair use doctrine.296 Similarly, 
the Ninth Circuit did not deny that home taping of sound recordings, as 
"intrinsic," "ordinary," consumer-type use, long considered permissible, 
might constitute fair use. 297 
It is true that, historically, new authors were given fair use treatment 
more often than ordinary users. The reason may simply be that most markets 
are set up to serve ordinary consumers, and usually function well in that 
context; market failure will arise more often in circumstances where users seek 
to employ the work in unexpected ways and fair use will thus tend to be 
awarded in such circumstances. In addition, the public interests served by 
second authors are likely to be stronger than the interests served by ordinary 
consumers298 and injury to incentives may be less severe when the user is a 
second author,299 whose use is unlikely to be repeated by others, and whose 
work, by being different from the copyrighted work, may not be competitive 
with it for the same ultimate audience. But none of these functional consider-
295. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1980). 
296. See House Report, supra note 10, at 65-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 
News at 5678-88; Senate Report, supra note 26, at 61-67. See also the congressional debate 
regarding sound recordings, 117 Cong. Rec. 34, 748 (1971) (statement of Representative kasten-
meier) (child's home recording of broadcast of music for listening pleasure is fair use), quoted in 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. at 446. 
297. The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of home sound recordings in terms of an 
exemption potentially arising out of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. (The Ninth 
Circuit inquired whether, if such an exemption existed, it would apply to home video-tape 
recording. The court concluded that it would not.) However, such characterization is erroneous. 
Whether or not persons who make tape recordings of music at home are copyright infringers is an 
issue that cannot be resolved solely by reference to an exemption potentially arising out of the 
1971 legislative history. See Nimmer, supra note 125, at 1505. Long before the Sound Recording 
Amendment of 1971, the copyright in musical compositions (including, e.g., musical scores) could 
be infringed by the making of unauthorized recordings. See§ l(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909, 
35 Stat. 1075, codified and reenacted 1947, amended 1976. When Congress in 1971 expressed a 
belief that home audio recording "over the past 20 years" was not an infringement, Nimmer, 
supra note 125, at 1509 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 987, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1566, 1572), the only possible legal basis for that belief was fair 
use. Id. at 1509-11. See also remarks of Representative Kastenmeier, 480 F. Supp. at 446 
(discussed in Nimmer, supra 125, at I511-12). Thus it is fair use that must be applied if home 
audio recording is to be immune from liability, and such recording is clearly "an intrinsic use." 
Professor Nimmer argues that although "[c]ourts and commentators have assumed that 
audio home recording is beyond the reach of copyright laws," Nimmer, supra note 125, at 1505, 
such recording should be considered an infringement. In making this argument, he relies on 
Seltzer's view that intrinsic uses should not be granted fair use treatment. Id. at 1521-22. 
However, Professor Nimmer himself urges in support of his conclusion the practicality of various 
methods of payment, thus revealing an implicit concern with market cure. Id. at 1525-34. 
Moreover, he intimates a willingness to accept an economic justification for fair use. See id. at 
1530 n.88. 
298. On the other hand, ordinary consumers are more likely to be deterred by transaction 
costs. See supra note 259. 
299. See supra text accompanying notes I 15-I6. 
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ations suggest there should be a per se bar against awarding fair use to 
ordinary users; on the contrary, in the case where the transactions between 
copyright owner and ordinary user exhibit the same characteristics of market 
failure, small injury, and public interest, fair use may well be appropriate. 300 
The court of appeals stated that the inclusion of photocopying, videorecord-
ing, and other "intrinsic" uses within fair use would cause "a fundamental 
restructuring of the copyright system not justified by the statutory scheme or 
traditional notions of fair use. " 301 This Article, however, has shown that it is 
the user faced with market failure, whether he is a second author or an 
"ordinary" user, who is the traditional judicial and statutory object of fair 
use solicitude. 
In light of the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Leon Seltzer's "intrinsic use" 
terminology, it is important to note that Seltzer's own underlying approach to 
fair use is arguably adaptable to a market failure analysis. He suggests that "a 
more useful fair use statute"302 than the one enacted by Congress would begin 
as follows: "Fair use is use that is necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, 
literature, and the arts AND does not deprive the creator of the work of an 
appropriately expected economic reward."303 On the surface, Seltzer's prohi-
bition against extending fair use to "ordinary" uses would seem to follow 
quite logically from his ideal statute's concern with appropriately expected 
economic reward: the ordinary user is precisely the person from whom the 
copyright owner expects remuneration, so that granting fair use to such 
person would violate Seltzer's statute by "depriving the creator ... of an 
appropriately expected economic reward." But, where there is market failure, 
enforcing the owner's rights may not bring economic reward; more funda-
mentally, the author's normal expectations will involve his evaluation of what 
kind of markets exist for his work. In the presence of market failure, "ordi-
nary" users become extraordinary, and fair use can be granted without depri-
vation of "appropriately expected" receipts. Thus, ordinary users faced with 
market failure might have some claim to fair use under the basic clause of 
Seltzer's proposed statute. 304 
300. See generally supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text. 
301. 659 F.2d at 971. 
The Ninth Circuit also asserted that use of the Williams & Wilkins approach would under-
mine incentives, id. at 970, and that such an approach would put copyright holders "in the 
unenviable position of proving damage in a context in which extreme difficulty is acknowledged," 
id. at 971. This Article has suggested that a substantial injury hurdle and sensitive application of 
burdens of proof can avoid these dangers. See supra notes 104-24 & 135-48 and accompanying 
text. The Ninth Circuit noted that "home users assign economic value to their ability to have 
control over access to copyrighted works," and that "[t]he copyright Jaws would seem to require 
that the copyright owner be given the opportunity to exploit this market." 659 F.2d at 974. 
Without an exploration of market cures, however, it is unclear whether such opportunity could be 
exploited and what constitutes the "potential market" for the copyrighted works. 
302. L. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 31. 
303. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
304. Seltzer himself does not develop his basic clause in this way, of course. See id. at 36 
("Fair use, if it is to have any coherent meaning, must by itself suggest to both creator and society 
that it is not part of the normal market. "(emphasis in original)). Seltzer's ideal statute would not 
appear to direct a court to take into account the economic and structural context in which 
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Seltzer's conclusions regarding intrinsic 
use is also questionable since, as Seltzer acknowledged, Congress did not 
follow his recommended pattern. 305 In particular, Congress did not adopt any 
strict conceptual distinction between those uses properly treated by exemp-
tions and those properly treated by fair use. 306 Seltzer argued that Congress 
erred in doing so;307 this Article argues that the legislation accurately reflected 
past judicial developments. In any event, the open-ended nature of the con-
gressional approach to fair use suggests that endorsement of an inflexible 
standard like ''intrinsic use'' would be inappropriate. 
A market-oriented test would be more consistent with this flexible con-
gressional approach, and is capable of addressing the Betamax problem. 
Under the proposed three-part test, the first issue would be to identify whether 
market failure potentially appears in the home videorecording context. It 
does, in two areas. Home users might well find transaction costs prohibitively 
high if they were required to bargain individually with copyright owners over 
the right to tape each desired program. The mere task of identifying the 
copyright owners in advance of broadcasts might present insurmountable 
difficulties. Second, prohibitions against home taping might be impossible to 
enforce; the potential loss of privacy might pose a cost higher than the society 
would wish to bear, 308 and the economic cost to the copyright owners of 
identifying potential violators and bringing them to justice might be greater 
than any profits likely to be generated by deterrence of unauthorized tap-
ing. 309 Bargains that cannot be enforced present a classic type of market 
failure. 310 
Theoretically, it is possible that both aspects of the market failure could 
be cured if the manufacturers of videorecorders and videorecording tape are 
subjected to liability judgments. 311 The court could potentially "award dam-
ages or a continuing royalty,"312 which would act as an incentive to the liable 
parties to set up a workable collection system, or the court might itself take 
steps toward such a system. 313 Among the suggestions that have been dis-
defendant's use appears. Rather, he suggests that the second clause of his ideal statute might read: 
"In determining whether the use made of a work in a particular case deprives its creator of such a 
reward, account should be taken first of the nature of the copyrighted work and then of the 
purpose, character, and extent of the use." Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). 
305. Id. at 27-28, 40. 
306. Id. at 27-28. 
307. Id. 
308. See Universal City Studios, Inc., 480 F. Supp. at 446, 454, 468. 
309. In the event of a criminal violation, the government would of course bear the transac-
tion costs. However, criminal liability for infringement applies only to "[a]ny person who 
infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain." 17 U .S.C. § 506(a) (1976). 
310. See supra note 48. 
311. Defendants in Universal City Studios, Inc. included, inter alia, the manufacturers of the 
Betamax videorecorder and of videorecording tapes. 659 F.2d at 964. See Stanford Note, supra 
note 121, at 257-62. 
312. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d at 976. 
313. Query whether these remedies are within the court's own injunctive powers. See Stan-
ford Note, supra note 121, at 261; supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. Also, a court 
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cussed are imposing royalty charges to be collected at the time of recorder or 
tape purchases as an "add-on" to the price.314 Collection of the royalty fees 
and monitoring of the collection process might thus be practicable, easing the 
enforcement burden. A centralized agent might receive and distribute the 
royalty funds proportionately to the owners of popular programs at a level of 
transaction cost less than that which would be necessary if individual bargains 
were to be required.315 
Viewed from this perspective, the key questions are whether such market 
cures will evolve, whether they will be practicable, and what ought to be a 
court's role in achieving them. The Betamax case might be decided either way 
under this analysis, depending on what additional findings were made. If a 
market cure were achievable through a finding of liability, and if a grant of 
fair use would deprive the plaintiffs of substantial revenues from this potential 
market, fair use would be inappropriate because the substantial injury hurdle 
could not be surmounted. If, however, the court determined that a market 
cure were not practicable, further inquiry would follow. The court would then 
"weigh . . . the 'benefit' of an extremely popular increase in access with the 
'harm' to a plaintiff."316 If the court found that the balance favored defend-
ants, and if it found that judgment for defendants would not substantially 
injure plaintiffs' incentives, fair use would be granted; otherwise, liability 
would be imposed. 
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals adequately addressed 
the question of market cure. The district court held that even if home taping 
constituted copyright infringement, the manufacturers would not have been 
liable.317 Under such a view, the possible market cure discussed above would 
be unavailable. 318 The court of appeals imposed liability on the manufactur-
ers. 319 If that court was correct in its approach to contributory liability, such 
market cures are potentially in the hands of the courts. However, the court 
declined to focus on the question. 320 In fact, it rejected the notion that the 
practicability or availability of relief (i.e., market cure) should be relevant to 
should consider the administrative costs of its own actions in deciding on what course to follow. If 
administrative costs are high in relation to the benefits expected, an attempt at market cure may 
be undesirable. 
314. See Stanford Note, supra note 121, at 261-62; McCullaugh, Shock Vibrates through 
Industry, Billboard, Oct. 31, 1981, at 1. See also Demsetz, supra note 48, at 306 ("In many 
instances it may be possible to tie in the consumption of a second product with consumption of 
the collective good, and private incentives may very well exist for the production of the tied-in 
good because exclusion is possible."). Of course, further factual investigation would be necessary 
to know if such market cures would be practicable. See, e.g., McCullaugh, supra ("execution and 
administration" of hardware surcharge system viewed by some as "nightmarish"). 
315. Performing rights societies serve a similar function for musical works today, under 
judicial antitrust supervision. See A. Latman & R. Gorman, supra note 19, at 455-58. 
316. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d at 971. The Ninth Circuit accurately described 
the procedure while rejecting it. 
317. 480 F. Supp. at 457-62. See also the district court's discussion of injunctive relief, id. at 
463-69. 
318. "[R]equiring copyright holders to sue individual home users might amount to a total 
exemption for the Betamax .... " Stanford Note, supra note 121, at 258. 
319. 659 F.2d at 974-76. 
320. It seemed to assume that such a cure was possible, however. See id. at 976-77. 
(" [D]amages or a continuing royalty . . . may very well be an acceptable resolution in this 
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the issue of liability versus fair use. 321 It thereby imposed on society the 
deliberately unconsidered risk that either access would cease, or that wide-
spread and unredressed copyright violations would bring the law into disre-
pute or ridicule. Once the court of appeals rejected the district court's view of 
contributory liability, it should have remanded the case for further findings on 
the issue of market cure. 
C. Summary 
The Williams & Wilkins court seemed to focus primarily on the social 
interests served by defendant's photocopying practices. The Betamax court 
seemed to focus on the property owner's interests. It is hoped that the three-
part test presented here can unify both perspectives. 
CONCLUSION 
An economic and structural analysis of the fair use doctrine and its place 
in the copyright scheme reveals that fair use is ordinarily granted when the 
market cannot be relied upon to allow socially desirable access to, and use of, 
copyrighted works. This Article has presented a three-part test for fair use that 
reflects this focus on market failure, and has traced how this test could be 
incorporated within the traditional approach to fair use. Moreover, the dis-
cussion of the Williams & Wilkins opinion, which most closely applied the 
three-part test, and of the Betamax case, demonstrated that the test can 
provide a framework in which the courts can directly face the underlying 
issues that should govern the application of fair use doctrine to new technolo-
gies. 
It is important that a market failure approach to fair use not be expanded 
into a justification for allowing court intervention whenever the market fails 
to reach "perfect" results, for no market is ever perfect. What emerges from 
the case law and the copyright statute is a focus on individual types of 
transactions, not a concern with restructuring an entire set of markets to reach 
ideal goals, and an identification of those imperfections that will not be 
tolerated because of their particular impact on dissemination and the ultimate 
goals of copyright.. That transactional emphasis is the proper one. It allows 
particularly desirable transfers that are blocked by market failure to go for-
ward outside the market, but also allows the courts to impose liability where 
widespread use of this bypass would cause substantial injury to the copyright 
owner. This Article has accordingly discussed not only the market failure 
grounds for fair use, but also the limitations that should be placed on employ-
ment of the doctrine. It is submitted that the three-part test presented here is 
of assistance in analyzing fair use issues and provides a helpful tool for 
predicting and guiding decisions in this most difficult area of copyright law. 
context."). Among the sources cited by the Ninth Circuit was the Stanford Note, supra note 121, 
which discussed methods of market restructuring. See 659 F.2d 966 nn.1,2. Explicit consideration 
of the possibility was necessary, to avoid misunderstandings and ridicule on the one hand, and, on 
the other, to avoid the danger of a complete cessation of use of the new technology. See supra 
note 124 (discussing popular reactions to the Ninth Circuit decision). 
321. 659 F.2d at 976. 
